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Karesh: Partnership Law and the Uniform Partnership Act in South Carolina

PARTNERSHIP LAW AND THE UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP
ACT IN SOUTH CAROLINA-Part 4
COLEMAN KARESH*

SECTION 36. Effect of Dissolution on Partner's Existing Liability.
(1) The dissolution of the partnership does not of itself discharge the existing liability of any partner.
(2) A partner is discharged from any existing liability upon dissolution of the partnership by an agreement to that effect between himself, the partnership
creditor and the person or partnership continuing the
business; and such agreement may be inferred from the
course of dealing between the creditor having knowledge of the dissolution and the person or partnership
continuing the business.
(3) Where a person agrees to assume the existing obligations of a dissolved partnership, the partners whose
obligations have been assumed shall be discharged from
any liability to any creditor of the partnership who,
knowing of the agreement, consents to a material alteration in the nature or time of payment of such obligations.
(4) The individual property of a deceased partner
shall be liable for all obligations of the partnership incurred while he was a partner but subject to the prior
payment of his separate debts.
Subsection (1), preserving the existing liabilities of partners after dissolution, is a restatement of a general rule
which, by decision, dicta or inference, has found approval in
many South Carolina cases. 97 3 Not only does dissolution not
*Professor of Law, University of South Carolina.

973. Dorrill v. Steamboat Co., (S. C. Mss. Dec. 1826)-(syll.) "The
liability of partners on a partnership contract * * is not affected by the
subsequent dissolution of the partnership or change of members-the
partners contracting are still liable on their contract." Kendrick v.
Campbell, -note 585, supra, at 525, 526; Kinloch v. Hamlin, note 120,
supra, at 20T Hart v. Finney, note 261, supra; Farrow v. Bivings, note
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of itself discharge the partners' obligations, but the partners
cannot by arrangement among themselves bring about their
discharge. Hence, particularly, when on dissolution the partnership liabilities are assumed by one or more of the partners, the assumption does not relieve the others of responsibility for them. 974 A partner does not, and cannot, throw off
obligations incurred while he was a member by wrongful dissolution of the partnership or by wrongful abandonment of
7
it.9
6 When dissolution is caused by the bankruptcy of a partner, the other partners remain bound for, and the partnership property is not withdrawn from subjection to, firm de9 76
mands.
An executory or continuing contract which by its nature
or terms depends upon the continued existence of the partnership ceases to be obligatory upon the partners after dis9 77
solution.
Although not involving the continued existence of partners' obligations, a pair of related questions should be noticed. While, ordinarily, the obligations of third persons to
552, supra, at 30-"A partner cannot exonerate himself from personal
liability for the existing engagements of the partnership by assigning
or selling out his interest in the concern." McLucas v. Durham, note
400, supra; Metz v. Commercial Bank, note 15, supra; Reab v. Pool, note
65, aupra; Allen v. Cooley, note 399, supra; Allen v. Cooley, 53 S. C.
414, 31 S. E. 634 (1898); Wright v. Hodges, note 389, supra; Welling v.
Crosland, note 74, supra; Strickland v. Strickland, note 400, supra;
Binswanger v. Green, note 400, supra.
974. MlcLucas v. Durham, note 400, supra; Reab v. Pool, note 65,
supra; Allen v. Cooley, note 399, supra; Allen v. Cooley, note 973, supra;
Wright v. Hodges, note 389, supra; Strickland v. Strickland, note 400,
sup'a; Binswanger v. Green, note 400, supra.
Where there is assumption, the creditor may nevertheless sue the
original debtor-partners and not the assuming partner alone. See the
cases cited in note 400, supra, and the text in which that note appears.
If the assuming partner becomes bankrupt, filing as a claim against
him of a partnership debt does not amount to a novation or otherwise
relieve the other partners. Wright v. Hodges, note 389, supra.
975. Kinloch v. Hamlin, note 120, supra, at 20--"It is true, he had no
right to dissolve the partnership, so far as the rights of the defendant
were concerned, nor could he exonerate himself from liability to others
by any act of his own." Welling v. Crosland, note 74, eupra, at 142"While, as between themselves, a member * * may withdraw, subject
to accountability for damage done to the others, he cannot by withdrawing or abandonment, relieve himself from obligations assumed
while he was a member."
976. Pelzer Mnfg. Co. v. Pitts, note 185, supra.
977. Holmes v. Caldwell, 8 RxCHARDsoN's LAW 247 (S. C. 1855)defendants, partners in cotton firm, agreed to give plaintiff all their
drayage business. The firm was dissolved by mutual consent and a new
firm was formed with some of the old members who refused to give
plaintiff its drayage. It was held that the non-employment of the plaintiff by the new firm was not a breach of the original contract.
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a firm are not affected by its dissolution,978 the contract may
be of such a character as to be contingent upon the continued
existence of the firm, and upon its dissolution performance
by the third person may no longer be claimed by the former
members or by a successor firm. 979 A guaranty of a partnership's promise to pay for goods to be purchased is vitiated
if the goods which are the subject of the guaranty are furnished to a corporation formed by the members, but the guaranty is effective if the guarantor expressly or impliedly consents to such an alteration of the guaranty contract.98 0
Novation and Release. While the partners cannot by their
own acts induce discharge of their obligations, their creditor
by dealings with some or all of them may bring it about. Subsection (2) presents an instance of strict novation which has
that result. It is not to be assumed with reason that only a
technical or strict novation, as set out in the subsection, will
have such an effect, although it is an obvious method of accomplishing it; and different circumstances of discharge, based
on other principles, may work the same result. Instances of
novation or similarly effective dealings are to be found in
the South Carolina cases. In Townsend v. Stevenson,98 ' the
plaintiff, holder of the notes of a firm, surrendered the notes in
return for the individual note of a partner who had assumed
the firm debts on dissolution; it was held, under the facts,
that the individual note had been accepted in payment of the
978. 68 C. J. S. 862.

979. Anderson v. Holmes, note 790, supra--defendants agreed to make

advances to firm composed of named plaintiff and another, who agreed

to ship naval stores in consideration therefor and gave chattel mortgage
as security for undertaking and repayment of advances. The firm was
dissolved by withdrawal of the second member, and a new firm was

formed by admission of another, the co-plaintiff. In this action for alleged wrongful failure to continue the advances and for wrongful sei-

zure under the mortgage, one of the defenses was that the contract having been made with the dissolved firm, the action could not be maintained
by the plaintiffs as a successor firm. This contention was concurred in
by the court, but it was held that it was for the jury to decide-as it
affirmatively did-whether the contract was renewed with the new firm.
980. Providence Machine Co. v. Browning, note 7, supra-guaranty

by one of partners of payment for machinery ordered in firm name but
shipped to corporation of same name formed by the partners; held question for jury to decide whether guarantor had consented to sale to corporation under terms of guaranty.
Cf. the opposite situation: A continuing guaranty addressed to an

individual cannot be acted upon by a firm subsequently formed by the
guarantee and another. Sollee v. Meugy, 1 BA=LY's LAW 620 (S. C.

1830).
981. 4 RIcHnARsoN's LAW 59 (S. C. 1850).
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firm notes, and the latter were declared extinguished. In Rowand v. Fraser,98 2 effect was given to an agreement between
two partners and a creditor, on dissolution, under which each
partner gave to the creditor a bond for one-half of the debt
and it was agreed that a chose in action in the hands of the
creditor belonging to the firm should be applied to payment
of the bonds. Where, on dissolution, a retiring partner left
the remaining partners in possession of the firm assets, taking
a release of liabilities from them, and the remaining partners
compounded firm debts by giving notes endorsed for their accommodation, the endorser, on subsequently paying the notes,
was held not entitled to recover from the withdrawing partner.98 3 The endorser was regarded as a volunteer, whose voluntary payment of the withdrawing partner's debt could not
make him the latter's creditor.
It has already been observed, under Section 15, under the
heading of Release of Partner, that at common law the release of one partner released all. Here again notice is to be
taken of Section 7038, S. C. CODE (1942), set out under the
same heading, which changes the law as it affects partners
after dissolution: the effect of the statute being to preserve
the liability of the other partners on the release of one, unless a contrary intention is manifested in writing.
Dealing with Assuming Partner. Subsection (3) is a clear
recognition of a principal-surety relationship which arises
upon the assumption of firm obligations by one or more partners. The assuming partner becomes the principal, and the
retired partners sureties. Although the obligations of partners are not discharged by dissolution and assumption, as
has been seen, the relation of principal and surety arising
out of the assumption agreement is one which the creditor,
knowing of the arrangement, is bound to respect. Hence, following familiar suretyship law, a material alteration in the
nature or time of payment of the obligation will discharge
98 4
the retired partners who stand in the position of sureties.
RICHARDSON'S LAW 325 (S. C. 1845).
983. Matthews v. Colburn, 1 STROBHART'S LA-v 258 (S. C. 1847).

982. 1

984. That subsection (3) is a recognition of the principal-surety re-

lationship created by an assumption agreement and as such a declaration of the majority rule, see MECHEM, PARTNERSHIP; § 428; CRANE,
PARTNERSHIP, § '79. That the subsection is so construed, see Drake v.
Hodgson, 194 N. Y. S. 875, 118 Misc. 503 (1922); Stikeman v. Hodgson,
75 N. Y. S. 2d 73, 272 App. Div. 627 (1947), app. den. 76 N. Y. S. 2d
537, 273 App. Div. 827 (1948). Other New York cases take the same
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There is comparatively little local law dealing with the new
status of the partners as established by an assumption agreement, but there is enough to indicate substantial harmony
with the essence of subsection (3)-that the new relation is
985
that of principal and surety.

view. In McClatchy Newpapers v. Robinson, 68 Cal. App. 2d 135, 155
P. 2d 882 (1945), an extension of time to an assuming partner, followed afterwards by a release, was held to discharge the retiring partner, the court applying Section 36. In Lenger v. Hulst, 259 Mich. 640, 244
N. W. 187 (1932), a retiring partner was held discharged by reason of
subsequent dealings with the assuming partner falling under the subsection; and the same result was reached in another Michigan case,
Wolverine Cigar Co. v. Knoppow, 253 Mich. 243, 235 N. W. 177 (1931),
although in this case the court ambiguously declares that the relation
was not one of suretyship but that the assuming partner's liability was
primary. In Field v. Fishkin, 180 Wis. 149, 192 N. W. 463 (1923), the
court admitted that a suretyship relation arose, but held that the creditor did not have to treat the former partners as other than joint principals; no reference is made, however, to subsection (3).
As with conventional suretyship, a reservation of remedies against the
partner-surety will keep the latter liable. See Bank of U. S. v. Moscowitz, 268 N. Y. S. 705, 105 Misc. 629 (1934).
985. Allen v. Cooley, note 973, supra-holding that because of the relation the retiring partner could, by way of exoneration, compel the
application of firm assets retained by the assuming partner to the payment of firm debts. See the dicta in the affirmed Circuit Court decree,
at p. 418, to the effect that extension of time to an assuming partner,
without consent of the retiring partner, will discharge the latter.
As has already been seen, under Section 15, an assuming partner may
be sued alone, his liability being treated as primary. As such it is not
exclusive, and it is reasonably apparent that suing him alone is not
the equivalent of a novation, and the other partners are still liablejust as any surety would be on failure to collect from the principal.
See Doty v. Crawford, note 399, supra; Allen v. Cooley, note 399, supra,
and the text in which these notes appear.
A retiring partner who is compelled to pay the debt which his copartner has assumed is, like other sureties, entitled to subrogation. See
SIMPSON, SuRETYsHIP, § 47 (1950).
It would seem that, under suretyship rules, a creditor's release of the
assuming partner would release by operation of law the other partners
as well. In Wright v. Hodges, note 389, supra, a partner who was
sued on a firm debt defended on the ground that, after the assuming
partner had become bankrupt, the creditor had filed his claim and participated in a composition. Because of a scarcity of facts as to the course
of the bankruptcy proceedings, the court did not go into the defense
based upon the composition, holding the defendant liable in the face
of other defenses. On general principles it would appear, however, that
the bankruptcy of an assuming partner, as with an ordinary principal,
does not discharge the other partners, even though the creditor has
filed his claim and taken part in a composition leading to the bankrupt partner's discharge. See SIMPSON, SURETYSHIP, §§ 67, 68.

While, under § 7038, S. C. CODE (1942), a composition with a partner after dissolution will not release the others in the absence of a contrary intention, it is believed that the provision has no other purpose
than to change the common law rule as to joint debtors, and that it has
nothing to do with and is not inconsistent with the new situation produced by an assumption agreement of which the creditor has knowledge.
For a holding to this effect under a similar statute in a stste in which
the U. P. A. is in effect, see Bank of U. S. v. Moscowitz, note 984, supra.
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Survival of Obligations on Death of Partner. Subsection
(4)-up to the language "but subject to the prior payment of
his separate debts"-is apparently designed to make it clear
that while partnership obligations are joint (as Section 15
(b) declares), the death of a partner does not absolve his estate from obligations incurred while he was a partner. In reality, if this is the purpose of the subsection, it does not state a
new doctrine; for while at law the whole duty becomes exclusively that of the survivor, English and American decisions alike have granted either immediate or ultimate recourse
against the estate of the deceased partner. The English cases
have treated partnership obligations so far joint and several
in equity as to permit direct and immediate resort to the deceased partner's estate, without prior recourse to the survivors and without the necessity of showing inability to collect
from them. 986 Many American cases have virtually followed the
same course; and the same result has been reached in some
states through statutes principally affecting joint obligations.987 In contrast, other jurisdictions have permitted the deceased partner's estate to be reached only after a showing of
insolvency of the living partners.988
These topics have largely been touched upon in the consideration, under Section 15, of Death of Partner as Affecting Actions Against Partners. As to South Carolina law, it has been
noticed that, while there have been procedural changes, the
estate of a deceased partner never escaped ultimate liability;
and that the present state of the law is that there may be a
joinder of the survivors and the representative of the deceased partner in a single action without, apparently, a precondition of the survivors' insolvency.989
It is reasonable to assume that the subsection does no more
than affirm the right of a firm creditor to reach a deceased
partner's estate, and that it does not prescribe the procedure
986. Wilkinson v. Henderson, 1 Alyl. & K. 582 (1833). The English
Partnership Act of 1890 (§ 9), declaring a partner jointly liable goes
on to provide that "after his death his estate is also severally liable
in a due course of administration for such debts and obligations."
See MECHEM, PARTNERSHIP, § 411; 4 CORBIN, CONTRACTS, § 930; 2
POMEROY'S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (5th Ed.), § 409; note, 61 A. L. R.
1410.
987. See the authorities and annotation cited in note 986, supra. For
list of the statutes, see 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, § 366.
988. See note, 61 A. L. R. 1410, 1419.
989. Wiesenfeld v. Byrd, note 269, supra; and see the discussion further
under Section 15.
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or the conditions under which such recourse is to be had.
There seem to be no cases in jurisdictions having the Act in
which this provision has been interpreted, and, specifically,
there are none in which it is declared that the method and
conditions appropriate for reaching the deceased partner's
estate have been altered by the provision. 990 To localize the
problem, it is a justifiable assumption that the subsection reflects pre-existing law in its basic principle of the survival
of individual liability, and that procedural and remedial requirements and limitations in the enforcement of the liability
are not affected.
The liability of partners in tort being joint and several,
there has not been the need for the intercession of equity or
for a curative statute in order to reach the estate of a deceased partner on a tort claim. This consideration and the
use of "obligations" in subsection (4) would seem to rule
out the applicability of the subsection to tort liability. In
cases involving the Act as it may have relation to tort liability on a partner's death, the courts have not referred to
subsection (4) but to other Sections of the Act, notably Section 13 and Section 15(a). It is the law of abatement and
not the law of joint obligations that has controlled the outcome of these cases, and recovery against the estate of a deceased partner has depended upon whether the cause of action
survived: if governed by unchanged common law rules the
tort liability dies with the partner dying as it might affect
his estate; if made to survive by applicable statutory change,
the liability can be asserted against his estate. 9 1 It is quite
clear, therefore, that subsection (4) does not ordain a survival of tort liability where it does not otherwise exist. Preexisting South Carolina law is patently in accord with the
cases referred to, since as has been seen, under Brown v.

990. In Georgian Press Co. v. Hill, 45 N. Y. S. 2d 561, 180 Misc. 548

(1943), affd. 48 N. Y. S. 2d 316, 181 Misc. 464 (1944), it was held that
a judgment could not be obtained against the executrix of a deceased
partner without showing inability to collect from the survivors, in keeping with New York law. No reference is made to Section 36(4).
991. Sumner v. Brown, 312 Pa. 124, 167 Atl. 315 (1933)) ; State Bank
of Binghamton v. Bache, 282 N. Y. S. 787, 156 Misc. 503 (1935); Kangas v. Winquist, 207 Minn. 315, 291 N. W. 292 (1940); Wallace v. Ran-

kin, 173 Fed. 2d 488 (C. C. A. 9, Cal., 1949). But even where the action
may have abated as to the deceased partner, it continues as to the survivors. Kangas v. Winquist, ante.
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Bailey, 99 2 a cause of action arising out of a tort not kept alive
by the Survival Statute will abate as to a partner's estate
upon his death.
The remainder of subsection (4)---"but subject to the prior
payment of his separate debts"-presents a problem of priorities between firm and separate obligations which will be
considered hereafter under Section 40.
SECTION 37. Right to Wind Up. Unless otherwise
agreed the partners who have not wrongfully dissolved
the partnership or the legal representative of the last
surviving partner, not bankrupt, has the right to wind
up the partnership affairs; provided, however, that any
partner, his legal representative or his assignee, upon
cause shown, may obtain winding up by the court.
This Section has already been foreshadowed to a considerable degree in other parts of this article, but a recounting of
some of the observations already made, together with supplementary or elaborating comments, is in order because of their
direct relation to the substance of the Section.
Broadly speaking, the Section is an adequate reflection of
pre-existing South Carolina law. There are apparently no
South Carolina cases which state in positive terms the coequal right of each partner in a firm not dissolved by death
or bankruptcy to wind up the affairs of the firm, but so much
is implied in the accepted principle that each partner has the
power to do all such acts as may be necessary to wind up.9 93
On dissolution by death, the duty, as well as the right, to
wind up passes to the surviving partner or partners. 994 On the
death of the last survivor, the duty and right pass to his personal representative. 995 The right of the survivor is exclusive;
and the personal representative of the deceased partner has
no authority to participate in the liquidation nor is he en992. Note 196, supra-and discussed under Section 15, Death of Partner as Affecting Actions Against Partners.
993. See under Sections 33 and 35.
994. See, under Section 15, Death of Partner as Affecting Actions by
Firm; under Section 35, Powers of Surviving Partner, especially the
cases cited in notes 877 and 878, supra. See, also, Section 25(d).
995. Dial v. Agnew, note 488, supra; Duncan v. Westerlund, note 565,
supra. See, also, Section 25(d).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol4/iss2/4

8

Karesh: Partnership Law and the Uniform Partnership Act in South Carolina
THE UNIFORM

PARTNERSHIP ACT

titled to the possession of any of the firm assets.996 Moreover,
when on voluntary dissolution one of the partners has been
appointed to liquidate, his personal representative does not
succeed to his rights or duties on his death; the survivor is
clothed with them. 997 The authority of the survivor to wind
up does not depend upon any consent of the successors in
interest of the deceased partner, and because the right to
liquidate does not pass to the deceased partner's personal
representative, the survivor is not justified in seeking appointment as administrator of his copartner's estate for
liquidating purposes.998 Neither case law nor statutes give the
Probate Court general jurisdiction over the surviving partner so as to compel him to account to it in liquidation, but
there is legislation compelling him to file a statement of firm
assets and liabilities as part of the record of the administration of the deceased partner's estate. 999
While the representatives of the deceased partner do not
participate in the liquidation, they are of course entitled to
an account, and it is the duty of the survivor to account to

them. 1000 He is accountable not only for what he has received,
996. Kinsler v. MeCants, note 196, supra; Manship v. Newton, note
550, supra.
997. Kinsler v. McCants, note 196, supra-liquidator turned over notes
to defendant as attorney for collection; after liquidator's death defendant collected notes and paid over to liquidator's personal representative; defendant held liable to plaintiff, surviving partner, for full
amount. See, also, Boyd v. Munro, note 759, supra-where firm of three
partners dissolved by death of one of them, and one of two remaining
partners undertook to collect assets, held that survivor (the third) entitled to the assets on the second partner's death.
998. Rowell v. Adams, note 631, supra.
999. § 8988, S. C. CODE (1942): "The survivor or survivors of every
firm or partnership shall within twenty (20) days after the death of
any member of such firm or partnership, file with the Judge of Probate, having jurisdiction of the estate of such deceased member a sworn
statement in writing showing the assets and liabilities of said firm or
partnership in detail: Provided, That the Judge of Probate may for
good cause shown, enlarge the time for the filing of such statement. The
Judge of Probate having jurisdiction shall have the same power and
authority to enforce the provisions of this section as he has with reference to the returns of executors and administrators."
In Elliott v. Flynn, note 499, supra, at 395, it is stated that the purpose of the statute is to protect the interests of creditors of the firm. It
is probable, also, that it is intended to serve the interests of the deceased
partner's representatives.
1000. Moffatt v. Thomson, note 562, sup'a, at 160; Schenk v. Lewis,
note 151, supra, at 248; Crews v. Sweet, note 364, supra, at 306. The
same thing is implied in the numerous cases which state the duty of
the survivor to make a proper distribution among the representatives
of the deceased partner after settlement of firm obligations. White v.
Union Ins. Co., note 307, supra, at 559; Dial v. Agnew, note 488, supra,
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but what he "ought to have received by reasonable diligence."1 100 The surviving partner is a fiduciary, and he has
been denominated a trustee' 0 02-certainly for the deceased
partner's successors in interest; and there are inferences that
00 3
he is a trustee for creditors.
Actions against third persons on obligations to the firm
are maintained by the survivor alone. 1004 Where the survivor
has died, his personal representative is the party to maintain
the action. 100 5 Other matters, already touched on, incident to
the surviving partner's conduct as liquidator are footnoted
below. 006
at 459; Schenk v. Lewis, note 151, supra, at 242. The list is not exclusive. The proposition is of course implicit in every case in which relief is sought or' granted to the deceased partner's representatives
against the survivor.
1001. lanship v. Newton, note 550, supra, at 266.
As to the survivor's duties generally, see, under Sections 33-35, Powers
of Surviving Partner.
1002. Cooper v. Merrihew, note 597, supra; Wiesenfeld v. Byrd, note
269, supra, at 114; Schenk v. Lewis, note 151, supra, at 242; Elliott v.
Flynn, note 499, supra, at 395. See, further, under Section 21.
1003. Wiesenfeld v. Byrd, note 269, supra; Schenk v. Lewis, note 151,
supra, at 242; Elliott v. Flynn, note 499, supra, at 395. The correctness
of treating the survivor as trustee for creditors is open to question.
While creditors may have derivative equities-to compel the application
of firm assets to the prior payment of firm debts-they can hardly be
said to have any beneficial interest as such in the property itself, and it
is difficult to find any fiduciary obligation towards them. It has been
said, even as to a firm not dissolved by death, that its funds "are impressed with a trust in favor of the partnership creditors." Brown v.
Bradley, note 736, supra, at 274. The criticism just made is all the
more applicable here. In Allen v. Cooley (53 S. C. 414), note 973,
supra, at 443, it was said that partnership property in which a partner
had transferred his interest to his copartner on assumption by the latter
of the firm debts was "impressed with a trust" for the purpose of meeting the debts. Even if it be conceded that there might have been a trust,
it would hardly extend to a trust for the benefit of creditors and would
logically be confined to the retiring partner.
1004. Kinsler v. McCants, note 196, supra; Younts v. Starnes, note
487, supra; Dial v. Agnew, note 488, supra; Crews v. Sweet, note 364,
supra. See, further, under Section 15, Death of Partner as Affecting Actions by Firm.
1005. Dial v. Agnew, note 488, supra; Duncan v. Westerlund, note 565,
8upro.

1006. As to:
Surviving partner's right to reimbursement for outlays made in liquidation, see, under Section 18, Indemnity.
Profits made after death of partner, see, under Section 18, Division of
Profits.
Interest chargeable against survivor in delayed or improper liquidation, see, under Section 18, Interest; and also for interest allowable to
survivor.
Compensation of surviving partner, see, under Section 18, Partner's
Right to Compensation.
Nature of survivor's title, see Section 25.
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The Section does not expressly provide that on dissolution
by bankruptcy, the non-bankrupt partner shall have the right
to wind up, but since the bankrupt partner is specifically denied the right, the privilege given to all the partners to liquidate must necessarily be given to the non-bankrupt partner
or partners. South Carolina law is in accord; the right and
duty to wind up are vested in the non-bankrupt partners,
whose powers in this regard are substantially the same as
10 0 7
those of a surviving partner.
As the Section indicates, the liquidation-at least where
dissolution is by act of the parties-may be controlled by
agreement, and the equal right to wind up which each partner possesses may be relinquished to one or more of the other
partners. It has already been seen that such agreements are
of common occurrence in the South Carolina cases.'10 0
The power of a court to interfere, for cause, with the liquidation by a partner otherwise entitled to the right is recognized in the concluding proviso in Section 37. Although the
South Carolina cases do not expressly state the rule, it has
been applied frequently. Customarily the process has been
through the appointment of a receiver, who takes the liquidation out of the hands of the partner or partners ordinarily
entitled to handle it.1009

SECTION 38. Rights of Partners to Application of Partnership Property.
(1) When dissolution is caused in any way, except in
contravention of the partnership agreement, each partner, as against his co-partners and all persons claiming
through them in respect of their interests in the partnership, unless otherwise agreed, may have the partnership
property applied to discharge its liabilities, and the surplus applied to pay in cash the net amount owing to the
respective partners. But if dissolution is caused by ex1007. Crews v. Sweet, note 364, supra. See, under Sections 33-35,

Powers of Non-Bankrupt Partner. See, also, 11 U. S. C. § 23 (5, i).
1008. See, under Section 33, Liquidating Partner. As to compensation
of liquidating partner, see, under Section 18, Partner's Rights to Compensation.
1009. See, under Section 22, Receiver. As to injunctions, see, under

the same section, Injunction.
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pulsion of a partner, bona fide under the partnership
agreement and if the expelled partner is discharged from
all partnership liabilities, either by payment or agreement under section 36(2), he shall receive in cash only
the net amount due him from the partnership.
(2) When dissolution is caused in contravention of
the partnership agreement the rights of the partners
shall be as follows:
(a) Each partner who has not caused dissolution
wrongfully
shall have,
(I) All the
rights specified in paragraph (1) of this
section, and
(II) The right, as against each partner who has
caused the dissolution wrongfully, to damages for breach
of the agreement.
(b) The partners who have not caused the dissolution wrongfully, if they all desire to continue the business in the same name, either by themselves or jointly
with others, may do so, during the agreed term for the
partnership and for that purpose may possess the partnership property, provided they secure the payment by
bond approved by the court, or pay to any partner who
has caused the dissolution wrongfully, the value of his
interest in the partnership at the dissolution, less any
damages recoverable under clause (2aII) of this section,
and in like manner indemnify him against all present or
future partnership liabilities.
(c) A partner who has caused the dissolution wrongfully shall have:
(I) If the business is not continued under the provisions of paragraph (2b) all the rights of a partner under paragraph (1), subject to clause (2aII), of this section,
(II) If the business is continued under paragraph (2b)
of.this section the right as against his co-partners and
all claiming through them in respect of their interests
in the partnership, to have the value of his interest in
the partnership, less any damages caused to his co-partners by the dissolution, ascertained and paid to him in
cash, or the payment secured by bond approved by the
court, and to be released from all existing liabilities of
the partnership; but in ascertaining the value of the
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partner's interest the value of the good-will of the business shall not be considered.
The greater part of Section 38 is devoted to situations
which, as yet, have not appeared in the South Carolina cases,
and its effect is to introduce new law. It has already been
seen, under Section 31, that a partnership may be dissolved
in contravention of agreement, and that the South Carolina
cases recognize such a possibility. The cases, as has been seen,
do not go beyond the declaration that 'a partner wrongfully
producing dissolutioi is subject to liability for damages ;1010
they do not state the further consequences. These consequences are detailed in the Section. In addition to prescribing damages for the wrongful dissolution, the Section specifies the wrongdoing partner's rights. It is important to observe that despite dissolution wrongfully brought about, the
innocent partners may continue the business, under prescribed conditions. 0 1' Although the Section speaks of indemnifying the wrongdoing partner "against all present or future partnership liabilities"--subsection (2) (b)-the choice
of the innocent partners in continuing the business can hardly be taken to mean an avoidance of the dissolution; once
having taken place, continuance of the business will not avert
or undo it.
Division in Cash. Subsection (1) declares that each partner, unless otherwise agreed, "may have the partnership property applied to discharge its liabilities, and the surplus applied to pay in cash the net amount owing to the respective
partners." In their note to Section 38, the Commissioners
state, "The right to each partner, where no agreement to
the contrary has been made, to have his share of the surplus paid to him in cash makes certain an existing uncertainty. At present it is not certain whether a partner may
1010. See Middleton v. Price, note 10, supra; Welling v. Crosland, note
74, supra. See, further, the discussion of these cases under Section 31,
Dissolution in Contravention of Agreement.

1011. That these conditions must be complied with, see Crossman v.
Gibney, 164 Wis. 395, 160 N. W. 172 (1916); Dow v. Beals, 268 N. Y. S.
425, 149 Misc. 631 (1933).

The Section- may affect the rule cf the decision in Kinloch v. Hamlin,

note 120, supra-where a partner who wrongfully abandoned the busi-

ness before the end of the term was held not entitled to profits afterwards. See discussion of this case under Section 31, Dissolution in Contravention of Agreement; and under Section 18, Division of Profits.
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not insist on a physical partition of the property remaining
after third persons have been paid.' 1 o12 It would seem that
the language of subsection (1) and the Commissioners' explanation indicate with reasonable clarity that a partner, or
his representative, does not have the right to demand a partition in kind even after the payment of debts to third persons.
The conclusion is rendered almost inevitable by the provision
that a partner may have the surplus applied to pay him in
cash-that is to say, the surplus after the payment of firm
debts. Despite this seemingly plain language, however, some
of the cases apparently take the position that if partnership
debts have been paid, a physical partition may be compelled,
even though all the partners or their representives are not
willing that it shall take place. 101 3 In taking this course,
which either overlooks the subsection or declines to accept
it at its face value, these cases have followed a generally accepted rule which, while recognizing the right of the partners
to demand the payment of their respective interests in cash,
tacks on a qualification that if firm debts have been paid par01 4
tition in kind may nevertheless be decreed.
While consideration of the problem in the South Carolina
cases is not extensive, they seem to indicate, on the whole,
that the process of winding up contemplates the reduction of
all the firm property to cash. 0 15 One case seems apposite to
the point involved and to conform to the rule of the subsec1012. So also is the draftsman's comment: 24 YALE L. J. 617, 629.
1013. Watterson v. Knapp, 35 Cal. App. 283, 95 P. 2d 154 (1939)Section 38 not mentioned; Hooper v. Barranti,
Ca
-,
184
P. 2d 688 (1947)-Section 38 not mentioned; Rinke v. Rinke,-Mich
, 48 N. W. 2d 201
(1951)-Section 38 referred to, but
court declares that, taken with other Sections of the Act (which ones
are not mentioned), it was not the intention of the legislature in adopting the Act to deny the right of partition in kind where firm debts
had been paid.
There are other cases which, while not referring to Section 38, deny
the right to physical partition, unless the partners are willing or have
effectually agreed upon it. Weisman v. Jenkin, 154 Pa. Super. 12, 34
A. 2d 907 (1943); Webber v. Rosenberg, 318 Mass. 768, 64 N. E. 2d
98 (1948).
1014. 68 C. J. S. 901, 902; 40 Am. Jur. 104; note, 77 A. L. R. 300.
1015. Moffatt v. Thomson, note 562, at 160-by surviving partner;

Schenk v. Lewis, note 151, supra-by surviving partner. Where the
firm is being wound up by a receiver, the course taken has been to sell
all the property and divide the proceeds. Wilson v. Wilson, note 24,
supra; Kennedy v. Hill, note 529, supra-in which there is the inference
that on dissolution assets shall be converted into cash, but that the
parties may agree otherwise. In actions for accounting and settlement,
the practice seems to be to direct a sale and division of proceeds. Gee

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol4/iss2/4

14

Karesh: Partnership Law and the Uniform Partnership Act in South Carolina
THE UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP AcT

tion. In Schenk v. Lewis, 10 16 which was an action by the survivors of a firm against the representatives of the deceased
partner for settlement and accounting, and in which it appeared that there were no outstanding firm debts, the court,
in considering the method of utilizing the property of the
late firm to satisfy the respective interests, declared (at p.
248) :
The assets being equitable, in the control of the court,
and impressed with a trust, neither the survivors of the
partnership nor the heirs at law of the deceased partner
have the right, as tenants in common of the real estate,
to demand a partition in kind or a sale for partition;
the equity of applying the assets to the above purposes
is superior to the right of partition.
In adjusting the equities of the parties the court declared
that the fairest method would be by appraisement rather
than sale, and directed that the interest of the deceased partner's representatives (which was only 8%) be offered to the
survivors at the appraisement of the interest ; 101 a in the
event the privilege of purchase was not exercised, the propefty should be exposed to public sale. This equitable latitude,
it is believed, is not a veiled acquiescence in a right of partition-particularly in view of the quoted language and a further observation by the court that the survivors, as liquidators, had the power to sell the property themselves or to apply
to the court for permission to sell.
There is the interesting possibility that, even without the
prescription of subsection (1), the nature of the partners'
ownership, as declared by the Act, may forestall compulsory
v. Humphries, note 549, supra; Stephens v. Stephens, note 7, supra;
Heretis v. Taggs, note 61, supra.

In Jones v. Smith, note 176, supra, the partnership property was

ordered "sold for partition" on a showing that there were no debts;
the issue, however, was whether the property in suit was firm property

or not, and did not touch the question of physical partition. Selling for

partition is, of course, not physical partition, and what it really amounts
to Is division in cash. For similar decree ordering partition by sale,

see McBrayer v. Mills, note 825, supra.
1016. Note 151, upra.

1016a. In Kennedy v. Hill, note 529, supra, where the liquidation was
by a receiver, one of the partners was allowed to take certain property

at its appraised value, the court, however, stating that it would have

been more logical if the receiver had disposed of it along with other
assets by sale.
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partition in kind. If the local partition statutes 0 17 are a chart
of the tenants to whom partition as such is available, the
statutes' designation of tenants in common and joint tenants
as the persons among whom partition may be had may rule
out compulsory partition among the partners. Under Section 25 of the Act, it will be remembered, partners are tenants in partnership; they are not tenants in common nor joint
tenants. 18
In any event, nothing prevents the partners or their representatives from effecting physical division if they all desire
it; and the qualifying words "unless otherwise agreed" in
subsection (1) recognize this possibility.
SECTION 39. Rights Where Partnership is Dissolved for
Fraud or Misrepresentation. Where a partnership contract is rescinded on the ground of the fraud or misrepresentation of one of the parties thereto, the party entitled to rescind is, without prejudice to any other right,
entitled,
(a) To a lien on, or right of retention of, the surplus of
the partnership property after satisfying the partnership liabilities to third persons for any sum of money
paid by him for the purchase of an interest in the partnership and for any capital or advances contributed by
him; and
(b) To stand, after all liabilities to third persons have
been satisfied, in the place of the creditors of the partnership for any payments made by him in respect of the
partnership liabilities; and
(c) To be indemnified by the person guilty of the fraud
or making the representation against all debts and liabilities of the partnership.
It is to be noticed that while the heading of Section 39
uses the term "dissolution", the term is not used in the body
1017. §§ 8826-8829, S. C.

CODE

(1942). A court of equity has inde-

pendent and inherent power to effect partition. Holley v. Glover, 36 S. C.
404, 15 S. E. 605, 16 L. R. A. 776, 31 Am. St. Rep. 883 (1891).

1018. See Webber v. Rosenberg, note 1013, supra, where this conclusion was reached in construing a partition statute, but the debts
having been paid and the partners having agreed on a division, the
court treated the tenancy in partnership as having been succeeded by
tenancy in common, which was the subject of partition.
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of the Section. It speaks of rescission. While the effect of
rescission is to nullify the partnership ab initio,119 the partnership contract in the meantime is treated as voidable and
not void. Hence, until the time of the decree the partnership
has existence, during which it may have engaged in business,
incurred liabilities, and so on. For all practical purposes, rescission by decree puts an end to the partnership-even
though it is by relation back-as effectively as dissolution by
decree. If the purpose of the Section is to treat rescission as
a species of dissolution, the power of a court to dissolve for
fraud or misrepresentation in the inception may be located
under Section 32(f), which provides for dissolution by decree "whenever other circumstances render a dissolution
equitable."
The Section is substantially a representation of prior law. 102'
The basis of subsection (c) is the voidable character of the
partnership contract. Until rescission the firm has such an
existence as will render the defrauded partner liable on obligations to third persons. These are not cast off by a rescission which destroys the partnership relation as from the
beginning. It is against such liabilities that the defrauded
partner is entitled to indemnity. 1022
Little appears in the South Carolina cases concerning fraud
or misrepresentation in the formation of a partnership; and
the Section is useful in newly spelling out some of the rights
of the partner who has been imposed upon. It is to be observed
that the Section expressly declares that the rights it affords
are without prejudice to any other right which the defrauded partner may have. The only South Carolina case, apparently, which deals with facts or alleged facts appropriate for
rescission, is Walker v. McDonald,10 23 which holds that there
cannot be in the same action a joinder of a cause of action
for return of money paid into a fraudulently formed partnership and a cause of action for a partnership accounting ;1024
1019. MECHEM, PARTNERSHIP, § 373; 68 C. J. S. 423.
1020. CRANE, PARTNERSHIP, § 86; 68 C. J. S. 421, 422.
1021. MECHEM, PARTNERSHIP, § 373; CRANE, PARTNERSHIP,

§ 86; 68
C. J. S. 422, 423; 40 Am. Jur. 303, 304.
1022. See Grossman v. Lewis, 226 Mass. 163, 115 N. E. 236, Ann. Cas.
1919A 739 (1917).
1023. Note 641, supra. This case has been discussed under Section 22.
See the text in which notes 646 and 664, supra, appear.

1024. For a similar holding see Davis v. Horan, 263 N. Y. S. 270,
273 App. Div. 761 (1933).
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there must be an election between them. It is clear that the
procedural principle announced in this case is not out of har10 25
mony with the Section.

SECTION 40. Rules for Distribution. In settling accounts
between the partners after dissolution, the following rules
shall be observed, subject to any agreement to the contrary:
(a) The assets of the partnership are;
(I) The partnership property,
(II) The contributions of the partners necessary for
payment of all the liabilities specified in clause (b) of
this paragraph.
(b) The liabilities of the partnership shall rank in
order of payment, as follows:
(I) Those owing to creditors other than partners,
(II) Those owing to partners other than for capital
and profits,
(III) Those owing to partners in respect of capital,
(IV) Those owing to partners in respect of profits.
(c) The assets shall be applied in the order of their declaration in clause (a) of this paragraph to the satisfaction of the liabilities.
(d) The partners shall contribute, as provided by section 18 (a) the amount necessary to satisfy the liabilities; but if any, but not all, of the partners are insolvent or, not being subject to process, refuse to contribute, the other partners shall contribute their share of the
liabilities, and, in the relative proportions in which they
share the profits, the additional amount necessary to pay
the liabilities.
(e) An assignee for the benefit of creditors or any person appointed by the court shall have the right to enforce the contributions specified in clause (d) of this
paragraph.
(f) Any partner or his legal representative shall have
1025. As to rescission or reformation of dissolution agreement induced by fraud, see Badder v. Saleeby, note 615, sup=; and discussion
of it in the text in which notes 688 and 813, supra, appear. As to reformation of written dissolution and assumption agreement on account of
mistake, see McLucas v. Durham, note 552, supra.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol4/iss2/4

18

Karesh: Partnership Law and the Uniform Partnership Act in South Carolina
THE UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT

the right to enforce the contributions specified in clause
(d) of this paragraph, to the extent of the amount which
he has paid in excess of his share of the liability.
(g) The individual property of a deceased partner shall
be liable for the contributions specified in clause (d) of
this paragraph.
(h) When partnership property and the individual
properties of the partners are in possession of a court for
distribution, partnership creditors shall have priority
on partnership property and separate creditors on individual property, saving the rights of lien or secured
creditors as heretofore.
(i) Where a partner has become bankrupt or his estate is insolvent the claims against his separate property
shall rank in the following order:
(I) Those owing to separate creditors.
(II) Those owing to partnership creditors,
(III) Those owing to partners by way of contribution.
Section 40 is multifarious, but many of the rules it contains are applications and corollaries of much of what has
gone before. In some respects comments which are made
upon the Section are repetitive of earlier statements.
Contribution. Subsections (d), (e), (f), (g) are amplifications of Section 18 (a) as that relates to the duty of each
partner to contribute for the purpose of satisfying firm liabilities. The topic of contribution has already been discussed under Section 18 ;1026 and it has been seen that the duty of contribution, under suitable circumstances, is called for by the South
Carolina cases. Subsection (d), in its reference to the ratio
of contribution when any of the partners is insolvent, is paralleled in the local law ;1027 but no cases appear in which the
ratio as affected by non-residence is involved. While there
seem to be no cases in which an assignee or person appointed
by the court has sought contribution as such (as authorized
1026. See, under Section 18, Sharing of Losses, Indemnity, Contribu-

tion, Partner as Creditor, Partner as Debtor. All these topics either
directly involve or are related to contribution.
1027. McLucas v. Durham, note 552, supra-in which it also held that
exoneration may be sought to compel contribution. This case has been
touched upon, under Section 18, in the topic of Contribution.
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by subsection e), there are cases in which an assignee or receiver has been declared entitled to treat, and claim, as a firm
asset obligations owing by a partner to the firm. 0 28 The principle which allows such an appointee to utilize a partner's
debt to the firm is not materially different-if different at
all-from the subsection's declaration that contribution may
be sought by the appointee.
Subsection (f) states the elemental right of contribution
available to a partner or his legal representative. The South
Carolina cases which have previously been noted are principally those in which a partner has sought contribution from
his copartner, 10 29 but there are instances among them in
which the legal representative of a partner has recovered contribution from the survivor. 1030 The rule of subsection (g)
allowing the recovery of contribution from the estate of a
deceased partner is likewise a reflection of local law. 0 31
Contribution as Affecting Firm's Insolvency. Subsection (a)
(II) pronounces as a firm asset the "contributions of the partners necessary for the payment of all the liabilities specified
in clause (b) of this paragraph." The Commissioners' note
explains that the adoption of the subsection "will end the
present confusion whether the contributions of the partners
are partnership assets or not"; and, after citing Federal
bankruptcy cases in which conflict appears, the note states
that, "The Commissioners believe that the opinion that such
1028. Wilson v. lcConnell, note 880, supra--assignee; Kennedy v.
Hill, note 529, sura-reeiver.
1029. Simpson v. Feltz, note 102, supra-discussed under Section 18,
Sharing of Losses; Coleman v. Coleman, note 552, supra; Farrow v.
Bivings, note 552, supra; Eakin v. Knox, note 552, supra; McLucas v.
Durham, note 552, supra.The last four cases are noted under Section 18,
Contribution.
1030. Brown v. Smith, note 523, supra; Gee v. Humphries, note 549,
supra. These cases are noted under Section 18, Contribution.
1031. Stokes v. Hodges, note 65, supra-mentioned under Section 18,
Indemnity.
See the comment in note 552, supra, as to the common law right of
contribution in favor of a survivor who had been compelled to pay
a firm debt when the estate of a deceased partner could not be sued.
It has been seen that, under § 7038, S. C. CODE (1942)-see, under
Section 15, Release of Partner, and also note 985, supra-it is provided
that a composition by a creditor with a partner after dissolution does
not discharge the non-compounding partner. § 7039, however, protects
the non-compounding partner by declaring that he "may require the
compounding debtor to contribute his ratable proportion of the joint
debt or of the partnership debts, as the case may be, as if the latter
had not been discharged."
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contributions are assets is supported by the better reasoning." The draftsman of the Act makes a similar comment,
adding that the subsection will end the confusion "which in
the Bankruptcy Act has rendered it possible in some districts
to put a partnership containing a solvent partner into bankruptcy."'103 2 The uncertainties in the Federal bankruptcy law to
which the Commissioners and the draftsman refer have been
largely dispelled, and the present state of the law seems to
be that a firm cannot be insolvent so long as there are any
solvent members-i.e., that if the firm assets plus the separate assets of the partners, after satisfying their individual
obligations, are sufficient to discharge partnership obligations, the firm is not insolvent. 10 3 3 Of the cases which state
the proposition the most positive in pronouncement is Mason
v. Mitchell,03 4 which denied a partner's petition for voluntary bankruptcy of the firm on a showing by the other and
resisting partner of his (the latter's) solvency. In commenting upon this case Professor Crane remarks that "It would
seem that in the case of a partnership subject to the U.P.A.,
the principal case [Mason v. Mitchell] would be followed, as,
under Section 40 (a), the assets of a partnership include both
the partnership property and the contributions of the partners necessary for payment of liabilities. If partners are able
to make such contributions, after taking care of their separate creditors, the assets of the partnership are sufficient to
meet its liabilities.' 03 5
South Carolina authority has not precisely dealt with contribution as an asset as it may relate to the question of a
firm's insolvency, but the available sources indicate that a
firm will not be so insulated as an entity from its members
as to preclude consideration of their private assets in determining whether the firm is insolvent. In Whilden v. Chap1032. 24 YALE L. J. 617, 629.

1033. Francis v. McNeal, 228 U. S. 695, 33 S. Ct. 701, 57 L. Ed. 1029,
L. R. A. 1915E 706 (1913)-holding that individual assets are drawn

into the bankruptcy administration of the firm as a sole bankrupt, and
stating as dictum that "ordinarily it would be impossible that a firm
should be insolvent while the members of it remained able to pay its
debts with money available for that end." Titus v. Maxwell, 281 Fed.
433 (C. C. A. 6, Mich., 1922); Mason v. Mitchell, 135 Fed. 2d 594
(C. C. A. 9, Cal., 1943); Kaufman-Brown Potato Co. v. Long, 182 Fed.
2d 59 (C. C. A. 3" Pa., 1950). See, also, CRANE, PARTNERSHIP, § 91,

and 'eases cited p. 399, n. 16.
1034. Note 1033, supra.
1035. CRANE & MAGRUDER,

CASES ON PARTNERSHIP

(2d Ed., 1951),

572, n. 7.
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man,1036 the court, in denying the appointment of a receiver
at the instance of creditors (although permitting it on motion of one partner on a showing of misconduct by the other),
declared (at p. 89):
...a creditor of a copartnership in order to maintain
an action for the appointment of a receiver of partnership assets must show that he has no adequate remedy
at law, that is, that he cannot enforce payment by judgment and execution. It is, therefore, necessary for him
to allege and prove not only the insolvency of the partnership as such, but the insolvency of the copartners as
individuals.
There have been other instances of the appointment of a
receiver for a firm on a showing of its insolvency, although
no point has been made as to the insolvency of the partners
as a prerequisite;1O' 7 but as Whilden v. Chapman remains
uncriticized, it still must be taken as representing the law in
its holding that a firm cannot be regarded as insolvent unless the members are also insolvent Since that holding is
consistent with the Act, the validity of Whilden v. Chapman
continues unimpaired.
Application of Firm Assets to Liabilities. Subsection (b)
is an ordering of the duties imposed by Section 18(a), (b),
which directs payment of liabilities to third persons (by inference) and to partners. Subsection (b) also ties in with
Section 26, which treats a partner's interest in the partnership as his share of profits and surplus.
The South Carolina cases have not in terms set down the
order of application of firm assets to liabilities, but there is
hardly any doubt that the result of the cases is in conformity
with the order prescribed in subsection (b). The various
levels can be put into place by deduction from statements
which set the position of particular claims against firm assets. There is, to begin with, the uniform recognition in a
1036. Note 492, supra.
1037. Jennings v. Automobile Sales Co., note 35, supra; Ex Parte
Planters' Bank, 122 S. C. 241, 115 S. E. 299 (1922). In the last case a
receiver vias appointed for the firm; none was appointed or asked for
the partners as individuals. It was held that a lower court order enjoining suits against the individual partners was in error. It does not
appear whether both firm and separate creditors were thus allowed to
sue, or only separate creditors.
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host of decisions of the paramount position of firm creditors
with respect to those assets. 10

38

The dominant status of firm

creditors is not by reason of a lien-they have none by virtue
of their being such creditors' 039-but by derivation through
the partners' rights to have the joint property applied to the
pay.ent of firm obligations. 1040 It is this equity which the subsection recognizes.
10 4 1
There is, as has been seen, the liability to repay capital,
and the liability to pay over profits only after capital has
been returned. 10 42 The duty to indemnify for or to repay advances is not so clearly marked out as to its place in the order of application, but it is fairly apparent that it is ahead
of return of capital and the division of profits. 0 43 With the
primacy of firm debts, the lowest station of profits, immediately preceded by liability to repay capital, it becomes manifest that the South Carolina order of application of firm assets corresponds to that declared by subsection (b).
1038. White v. Union Ins. Co., note 307, supra, at 559; Winslow v.
Chiffelle, note 44, supra, at 31; Bowden v. Schatzel, note 738, supra, at
313; Ancker v. Levy, 3 STROBHART'S EQurrY 197, 210 (S. C. 1849);
Wilson v. Bowden, note 739, supra, at 11; Farrar v. Haselden, note 407,
supra, at 337; Crawford v. Baum, note 737, supra, at 77; Kuhne v. Law,
note 196, supra, at 27; Rose v. Izard, note 99, supra, at 471; Jones v.
Smith, note 176, supra, at 537; Brown v. Bradley, note 736, supra, at
274.
In addition, see the cases cited in note 734, supra.
All the cases which are cited hereafter in the topic, Priorities Between
Firm and Separate Creditors, make the same point. See, particularly,
the cases cited in notes 1051 and 1059, infra.
1039. Wilson v. Bowden, note 739, supra, at 11. See, MEcHEM, PARTNERSHIP, §§ 439-441.
1040. Wardlaw v. Gray, note 369, supra, at 94:
...
as between the
parties themselves the very nature of the contract of partnership implies that the separate property of the partners shall not be taken for
partnership purposes-that the partnership shall pay its own debts,
and not subject the individual partners to that liability." Kuhne v.
Law, note 196, supra, at 27: " . . . partnership creditors must be satisfied before any portion of a partner's share of the surplus can go to
his creditor; for the separate creditor can sue but one, whereas to partnership creditors all are bound, and it is the right of the partners who
are not indebted to the separate creditor, that the partnership
debts
shall be paid." Jones v. Smith, note 176, supra, at 536: " . . . until the
final settlement of the account * * * each partner has a vested right,
which no dissolution can destroy, to apply the firm property to the payment of the firm debts."
The equity to compel payment of firm debts and to satisfy partnership debts is protected by the so-called partner's lien. See, under Section
18, that topic.
1041. See, under Section 18, Repayment of Capital and Advances, and
the cases noted in note 536, supra.
1042. See, under Section 18, Division of Profits, and cases cited in
note 529, supra.
1043. See Wilson v. Wilson, note 24, supra.
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It will be observed that the rule of the subsection does not
preclude the partners in settling accounts from varying or
disregarding the order prescribed, and the qualification is
expressed in the rule itself that it is subject to agreement to
the contrary. It is consistent here with the allowance of qualifying agreements in Section 18.
There is one seeming exception to the local rule stating
these priorities which may appear to conflict with the rule
of the subsection. Subsection (b) (II), in listing as second in
line obligations to partners other than for capital and profits, makes no distinction as to the nature of such obligations
or how they arose-whether for money advanced, property
furnished, services rendered for stipulated compensation, or
for firm debts paid by the partner with his own funds. A partner who pays firm debts out of his own pocket has been declared to be subrogated to the rights of the paid creditor. 1044 At
first impression it would seem that a partner who thus paid
firm debts would be allowed to compete with other firm creditors and share pro rata with them, but the South Carolina
cases in which subrogation has been decreed do not present
factual situations of contest between unpaid firm creditors
and the subrogated partner. Actually, the South Carolina rule
of subrogation is in accord with the general rule-i.e., that
subrogation is allowed, 1045 but the subrogated partner is uniformly denied the right to compete with other firm creditors. 10' 6 Subrogation may keep alive a debt which the partner-although primarily liable--may have had to pay, and
it may place him in a preferred position in relation to liabilities for capital and profits, but it is not to be used as a means
of putting him on a parity with third persons having claims
against the firm. In any event, the deferred position of the
partner in subsection (b) (II), covering all obligations to
him other than capital and profits, would appear to rule out
any lifting to first rank of a partner who has paid firm debts
with his individual means.
The liabilities of a firm do not, it will be observed, embrace the liabilities of a partner to his separate creditors. The
firm's assets are not a fund for the purpose, whether the
1044. Stokes v. Hodges, note 65, supra; Rose v. Izard, note 99, supra;
Gee v. Humphries, note 549, supra.
1045. 68 C. J. S. 649; 50 Am. Jur. 725--which seems to limit right to
payments made after dissolution.
1046. 68 C. J. S. 649; 40 Am. Jur. 410.
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separate creditor be a third person or b copartner, although
ultimately on a marshalling of firm and separate assets or
by a charging order under the ActO46a the interest of a partner-the surplus after the payment of firm debts and settlement of partnership accounts-may be reached by his separate creditors. Hence, a survivfng partner does not have the
right after all firm debts and accounts have been satisfied to
apply the balance due the deceased partner's estate to the
payment to himself of a debt of the deceased partner not
0 47
connected with the partnership business.
Priorities Between Firm and Separate Creditors. It has already-been pointed out that firm creditors have the dominant
position in the distribution of firm assets;1048 and since, as
has also been noticed, a partner's share which his separate
creditors can reach is the surplus remaining after payment
of firm debts and the adjustment of the partners' respective
demands, 0 49 it follows that, on a marshalling of assets, separate creditors cannot share in firm assets until firm creditors
have been paid. The important converse question is as to the
right of unpaid firm creditors to participate in the separate
estates of the partners. Subsection (h), which gives firm
creditors priority in firm assets, and separate creditors priority in separate assets, is in accord with the majority rule,
the Bankruptcy rule, and the English rule.105 0 The subsection changes prior South Carolina law, which had not followed
the majority rule or the other rules mentioned. The earlier
cases (from 1797 to 1827) were, however, harmonious with
the majority rule embodied in the subsection' 051-a rule sometimes called a "rule of reciprocity". 0 52 This older rule was thus
expressed:
1046a. Section 28.
1047. Moffatt v. Thomson, note 562, supra. This case has been discussed
under Section 18, Partner's Lien.
1048. See the cases and references to cases in note 1038, supra.
1049. See the cases cited in notes 733 and 734, supra.
1050. MECHEM, PARTNERSHIP, § 453; CRANE, PARTNERSHIP, § 94; 68

C. J. S.639; 40 Am. Jur. 402-404. The Bankruptcy rule is embodied in
Sec. 5(g), 11 U. S. C. § 23.
1051. Dickinson v. Legare, note 287, supra; Tunno v. Trezvant, 2 DESAUSSURE's EQUITY 264 (S. C. 1804); Woddrop v. Price, 3 DESAUSSuRE'S Eq izy 203 (5. C. 1811); Winslow v. Chiffelle, note 44, supra;

Hall v. Hall, 2 MCCORD'S EQUITY 269 302 (S.C. 1827); Sniffer v. Sass,
note 738, supra.
1052. See Blair v. Black, note 733, supra, at 357. Informally it has

been called the "jingle rule": partnership to partnership, separate to
separate.
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Where there are different classes of creditors, with
respect to the joint and separate estates of copartners,
each estate shall be applied exclusively in the first instance to the payment of its own creditors, and neither
the joint creditors shall come upon the separate estate,
nor the separate estate upon the joint, but only upon the
surplus of each that shall remain after each has fully
satisfied its own creditors. 053
The first breaking away from this earlier rule seems to
0 54 in
have occurred in 1832, in the case of Gowan v. Tunno,
which, while not declaring the rule in terms, the court allowed the judgment creditor of a firm subsequently dissolved
by death, after a showing of insufficiency of firm assets, to
participate in the deceased partner's estate ahead of a junior
separate judgment creditor under the applicable statutory
law stating the order of payment of a decedent's debts. In
Permtan v. Tunno, 0 55 decided five years afterwards, a creditor holding a joint and several bond of the partners was allowed to recover from a deceased partner's estate on the basis
of the deceased partner's several liability, without first resorting to the firm assets; but it is not clear whether the
court had the older rule in mind or the rule that might be
inferred from Gowan v. Tunno. Shortly afterwards, in the
same year, the newer rule was put into the form of a stated
proposition in the case of Wardlaw v. Gray; 0 6 and the pronouncements in this case were taken as the basis thereafter
of the newer rule. Despite some noncommittal observations
and expressions of doubt in a pair of cases'0 7 -later discountenanced or explained' 0 58 -the newer rule became solidly
entrenched and was consistently adhered to thereafter. 0 59
The principles governing the rights and priorities of firm and
1053. Winslow v. Chiffelle, note 44, spra,at 30.
1054. Note 381, supra.

1055. Note 374, supra.
1056. Note 369, supra.

1057. Kuhne v. Law, note 196, supra-where the rules are discussed

but no position taken; Adickes v. Lowry, 15 S. C. 128 (1880).

1058. Hutzler v. Phillips, note 176, supra, at 149, 150; Blair v. Black,

note 733, supra,at 358.
1059. Fleming v. Billings, note 184, supra; Farrar v. Haselden, note
407, supra; Gadsden v. Carson, 9 RIoHARDSON'S EQUITY 252 (S. C.
1857); Wilson v. McConnell, note 380, supra; Hutzler v. Phillips, note
176, supra; Trumbo v. Hamel, note 15, supra; Jones v. Smith, note 176,
supra; Blair v. Black, note 733, supra; Calhoun v. Bank of Greenwood,
note 18, supra; Middleton v. Taber, 46 S. C. 337, 24 S. E. 282 (1885).
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separate creditors have been stated in this summary:
Under the repeated decisions of the court of last resort in this State, the following propositions of law may
be said to be firmly established: Partnership assets are
primarily liabile to the payment of partnership debts.
No partner has any interest in the partnership assets
until all partnership debts have been paid. The individual debts of a partner can only be paid from that partner's share of partnership assets which remains after
the full payment of the partnership debts. Partnership
creditors have the right to participate in the distribution of the assets of each individual partner along with
the individual or separate creditors of the estate of each
partner, due regard being had to liens thereon. Separate
creditors of an individual who, as a partner is also indebted to partnership creditors, have an equity to compel partnership creditors to first exhaust partnership assets before participating with such individual creditors
10 60
in the assets of the individual debtor.
It will be noticed that under this rule allowing ratable
sharing by partnership creditors with separate creditors, the
latter nevertheless had an equity to compel firm creditors to
resort first to partnership assets. The equity thus afforded to
separate creditors was based on the two-fund doctrine: the
firm creditors having at their disposal the partnership fund
and the separate fund, and the separate creditors only one
(including the "dry balance" after payment of partnership
debts and settlement of firm accounts), 1061 the separate
creditors could force the firm creditors to look first to the
finn assets. 0 62 The simplest application of the rule appears
1060. Calhoun v. Bank of Greenwood, note 18, supra, at 365. The

meaning of "along with separate creditors" is pro rata. See the other
cases cited in note 1059, supra.
For discussion of the reasons for the South Carolina rule and the
opposing rule, see Kuhne v. Law, note 196, supra; Hutzler v. Phillips,
note 176, supra; Blair v. Black, note 733, supra.
For discussion elsewhere of the two rules, see Rodgers v. Meranda, 7
Ohio St. 179 (1857) ; Robinson v. Security Co., 87 Conn. 268, 87 Atl. 879,
Ann. Cas. 1915C 1170 (1913); In re Wilcox, 94 Fed 84 (D. C. D. Mass.,
1899).
1061. Gadsden v. Carson, note 1059, supra, at 337; Wilson v. McConnell, note 380, supra, at 510.
1062. Gowan v. Tunno, note 381, supra; Wardlaw v. Gray, note 369,
supra, at 113; Gadsden v. Carson, note 1059, supra; Wilson v. McConnell, note 380, supra; Hutzler v. Phillips, note 176, supra; Blair v. Black,
note 733, supra; Calhoun v. Bank of Greenwood, note 18, supra.
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in the cases in which partnership creditors, after using up
firm assets, were allowed to come in pari passu with separate
creditors in the separate estate, subject to the order of priorities as prescribed by statute if the estate was that of a
deceased partner. 106 3 In other cases the rule was involved in
assignments for the benefit of creditors. Assignments of firm
and separate properties which directed payment to creditors
at variance with the rule were treated as illegal preferences ;1064 those which conformed to it were sanctioned. 1 65
These various results based on the pre-existing rule now,
of course, go into discard with the adoption of the Act; but
as a practical matter, except where the estate of a deceased
partner is involved, the effects are not so sweeping as one
might conjecture. The use of the assignment for the benefit of creditors has no current vogue, and insolvency is more
frequently a matter of bankruptcy administration than a
concern of the state courts. And in bankruptcy, as has been
seen, the rule of the Act has long been the law.
1063. Gowan v. Tunno, note 381, supra-estate of deceased partner;
Wardlaw v. Gray, note 369, supra-same; Wilson v. McConnell, note
380, supra-same; Hutzler v. Phillips, note 176, supra-same; Fleming
v. Billings, note 184, supra--estate of living partner. In Farrar v.
Haselden, note 407, supra, where a firm creditor had obtained a judgment against the resident members of the firm and the judgment had
been returned nulla bona as to the resident partners and the firm assets,
the creditor was allowed to sue in equity to reach the interest of the
non-resident partner in a fund within the state on calling in other
creditors to establish their claims; the court stating in effect the equal
right of the firm and separate creditors to share in the fund.
1064. Blair v. Black, note 733, supra-assignment which directed firm
property to be applied first to firm debts and separate property to separate debts; Middleton v. Taber, note 1059, supra-assignment of firm
and separate properties which provided for equal participation among
all creditors.
1065. Gadsden v. Carson, note 1059, supra-assignment of individual
property to pay firm and separate creditors, but held fraudulent on another ground; Trumbo v. Hamel, note 15, supra-assignment of firm
property alone for payment of firm debts, not fraudulent as to separate
creditors. A separate creditor cannot, of course, compete with firm creditors in assigned firm assets. Calhoun v. Bank of Greenwood, note 18,
supra. In that case an individual conducted two businesses under distinct firm names, and he made advances to one business out of the funds
of the other. Later he took another person into the borrowing business
as a partner under an agreement that the new firm was to assume all
its liabilities. Thereafter the assets of the firm and of the individual
partner in his other business were separately assigned, and the assignee of the latter sought to participate as a firm creditor in the assigned property of the firm. It was held that the initial transactions of
borrowing and lending were not those between separate entities (see
discussion of this case under Section 6, Partnership as Entity), and that
the assumption of debts by the new firm did not include those which the
partner owed himself; and that, therefore, the assignee of the individual partner was not a firm creditor, if a creditor at all.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol4/iss2/4

28

Karesh: Partnership Law and the Uniform Partnership Act in South Carolina
THE UNIFORM

PARTNERSHIP ACT

Double Proof Against Firm and Separate Estates. Nothing
precludes a partner either at common law or under the
Act 066 from adding his separate promise to a firm obligation. When this occurs the creditor is both a firm creditor
and a separate creditor, and in the latter character he is as
much a separate creditor as any separate creditors and entitled to participate in individual assets along with them.
He thus obtains the advantage of double proof-i.e., proving
against and sharing in both estates. Certainly this is true
when by a distinct contract a partner comes under additional
liability, as when he is surety, guarantor or endorser for firm
obligations. 10 67 The law is not so clearly settled as to the availability of double proof where the obligation is represented by
a single instrument binding the partners jointly and sev1
erally, but the weight of authority appears to allow it. 068
South Carolina law on the point is scarce, but one case
seems to indicate that if there is a joint and several obligation of the partners, the several promises make the creditor
a separate claimant entitled to participate as such in the individual estates. It has already been seen, under Perman v.
Tunno, 0 69 discussed a few paragraphs back, that the holder
of a bond signed by the partners jointly and severally was
entitled to payment out of the separate estate of a deceased
partner without compelling him to look to the firm assets.
The basis of the decision was the view that by binding himself severally also a partner becomes a separate debtor as
". . . any partner may enter into a sepa1066. See Section 15(b)rate obligation to perform a partnership contract."
1067. MECHEM, PARTNERSHIP, § 458; CRANE, PARTNERSHIP, § 95; 6
REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY (4th Ed.), § 2917; Mitchell v. Hampel, 276

U. S. 299, 48 S. Ct. 308, 72 L. Ed. 582 (1928)-surety, bankruptcy;
Simmons v. Simmons, 215 Iowa 654, 246 N. W. 597 (1933) -guarantor;

Fourth National Bank v. Mead, 216 Mass. 521, 104 N. E. 377, 52 L.
R. A. (N. S.) (1914)--endorser; Buckingham v. First Nat. Bank, 131
Fed 192 (C. C. A. 6, Tenn., 1904), cert. den. 195 U. S. 630, 25 S. Ct.

788, 49 L. Ed. 352 (1904)--endorser, bankruptcy.
1068. MECHEM, PARTNERSHIP, § 458; CRANE, PARTNERSHIP, § 95; 6
REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY (4th Ed.), § 2917; Ex Parte Nason, 70 Me.

363 (1880); Robinson v. Seaboard Nat. Bank, 247 Fed. 669 (C. C. A.
3, Pa., 1918), 10 A. L. R. 842, aff. In re W. S. Kuhn Co., 241 Fed. 935

(1918), cert. de

248 U. S.567, 39 S. Ct. 9, 63 L. Ed. 425 (1918); In

re R. P. Brown & Co., 8 Fed. 2d 53 (D. C. Ga., 1925); Bank of Reidsville v. Burton, 259 Fed. 418 (C. C. A. 4, N. C., 1919). Contra, In re

Mosier, 112-Fed. 138 (D. C. Vt., 1901). Other than the first case, all
are bankruptcy cases, but their logic is applicable to state-controlled in-

solvencies. In re Mosier, ante, seems at present ineffective.
See, also, CRANE & MAGRUDER, CASES ON PARTNERSHIP (2d Ed., 1951),
592. n. 14; note, 10 A. L. R. 851.
1069. Note 374, supra.
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well as a joint one, and the creditor acquires distinct rights.
Whether the rule of distribution followed in Permcn v. Tunno
was the older rule (now embodied in the Act) or the later
rule (now superseded by the Act) the recognition of the dual
character and rights of such a creditor is compelling-or at
least persuasive-precedent that simultaneous proof may be
had in both the firm and separate estates. The advantage of
securing the additional separate promises-usually endorsement-has long been understood and appreciated in South
Carolina, but with an eye principally to bankruptcy. The less
favorable position to which a partnership creditor has been
reduced by the Act-that is, less favorable than under the replaced rule of distribution-makes such added promises all
the more useful locally, particularly in asserting claims
against a deceased partner's estate.
No South Carolina cases deal with the provability of tort
claims for which partners may be liable. Elsewhere the view
has been taken that since such liability is joint and several,
the claimant may assert his claim against the separate estate without being deferred to any balance after satisfaction
70
of separate creditors. 0
Priority of Liens. Subsection (h), while according priority
in the firm and separate estates to the respective classes of
creditors, specifically saves and preserves the rights of lien
creditors. The priorities which are afforded are in the nature of equities which cannot disturb prior legal liens; and
the reservation of the subsection is manifestly a restatement
1071
of general law.
South Carolina authority, under both the earlier and
later rules of distribution, concedes the superiority of liens
over the equities possessed by the respective creditors. Thus,
1070. In re Peck, 206 N. Y. 55, 99 N. E. 258, 41 L. R. A. (N. S.)
1223, Ann. Cas. 1914A 798 (1912). This case was decided before the
adoption of the U. P. A., but since its adoption the same result was
reached in another case. Matter of Seybel, 207 N. Y. S. 765, 124 Misc.
297 (1925). The logic of these cases extends to joint and several
promises.
In bankruptcy, the construction of the Bankruptcy Act as it relates
to liquidated claims may work a different result. Reynolds v. Reynolds,
188 Fed. 611 (C. C. A. 1, Mass.,), 39 L. R. A. 391 (1911); Schall v.
Camors, 251 U. S. 239, 40 S. Ct. 135, 64 L. Ed. 247, 10 A. L. R. 846
(1920).
See CRANE, PARTNERSHIP, § 95.
1071. MucHEbi. PARTNERSHIP, § 463.
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it has been stated in several cases under the now displaced
rule that while partnership creditors had the right to share
pro rata with separate creditors after exhausting firm assets,
the right was subject to liens in favor of others in the separate property.1072
It has already been observed, in discussing the topic of
Effect of Judgment-under Section 15--that a judgment
against the members of a firm for a partnership debt takes
precedence, when perfected as a lien, in separate property
over a subsequent judgment lien based on a separate debt.
In Kuhne v. Law,10 73 where such a factual situation was present, the court announced such a priority of liens-firm over
individual-and stated that since the action was one at law,
it could not consider (although there was academic discussion) any equities which the junior lienor might have. It is
manifest that whatever rule of distribution might be followed an unsecured or general individual creditor could not
compel a partnership creditor with a lien on the separate property to resort first to the firm property. Whether, however,
a junior separate lienholder could compel such prior resort
to firm property (assuming that the partnership creditor also
had a lien on the firm property) is a more difficult question,
the solution of which would depend upon whether the twofund doctrine could be invoked. The major premise in the
displaced rule of distribution that compelled a firm creditor
to look first to firm property was that the firm creditor had
two funds, the separate creditor only one. It has also been
stated, as previously noticed, that because of the two-fund
doctrine a purchaser from a partner of separate property subject to a firm judgment could compel recourse to firm property
subject to the judgment. 10 74 If the two-fund doctrine applies
to separate and firm estates, it would appear that a junior
separate lienor could compel a senior partnership lienor having a lien also on partnership property to go first against
the firm property. The difficult question remains, however,
whether, conceding that there are two funds to which the firm
1072. Fleming v. Billings, note 184, supra-individual judgment credi-

tors entitled to priority in separate property over firm creditors; Hutzler v. Phillips, note 176, supra, at 148; Calhoun v. Bank of Greenwood,
note 18, supra, at 365.
1073. Note 196, supra. See discussion of this case under Section 15,
Effect of Judgment.
1074. Stoney v. Schultz, note 385, supra-discussed under Section 15,
Effect of Judgment.
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lienor can look, they are funds to which the doctrine properly
applies. The fact that there are two funds is not enough, since
it is elemental that the funds must belong to the same debtor.1075 It has been decided elsewhere that in the case of separate and firm estates, the two funds do not belong to the common debtor, and that therefore the junior separate lienor cannot compel the senior firm lienor to proceed first against the
firm property.'0 76 In this there is a fair amount of logic, for
while the firm creditor may have two funds to look to, the
partnership property is not the property of the individual
partner; and though the individual partner is the co-owner
of the firm property, what the firm creditor proceeds against
when he resorts to firm property is not alone the interest of
the partner but that of his copartner. He is in effect being
compelled to exercise a right against the property of another
debtor. Since, however, the doctrine has been the basis of the
pre-existing rule of priorities, it may be that, despite the
outside authority mentioned, the junior separate lienor might
be allowed to demand the equity. It must be remembered at
all events, however, that "in the administration of legal liens,
equity follows the law, and gives them rank according to
their legal priorities,' 077 and that accordingly the senior
judgment lien remains a senior lien. It must be borne in
mind, too, that even if the two-fund doctrine is available in
the abstract, it cannot be applied when to do so would prejudice the senior lienor, or drive him to litigation or to a
78
doubtful security. 1
Of decided infrequency is the case where a separate creditor has a senior lien upon firm property. One such case, however, appears in South Carolina. In Winslow v. Chiffelle,1079
a partner transferred his interest in a tract of land to his
copartner. Both partners thereafter acquired the remaining
1075. See Norman v. Norman, 26 S. C. 41, 11 S. E. 1096 (1886);
Pace v. Still, 160 S. C. 258, 158 S. E. 120 (1931). But in suretyship it
is well recognized that the surety may compel the creditor to resort to
security of the principal. Central R. R. v. Claghorn, SPEER'S EQuiry
545 (S.C. 1844); Bank v. Campbell, 2 RICHARDSON'S EQUITY 179 (S.C.
1846) ; Canaday v. Boliver, 25 S.C. 547, 552 (1886).
1076. Savings & Loan Corp. v. Bear, 155 Va. 312, 154 S. E. 587, 75
A. L. R. 980 (1930).
1077. Farmers & Merchants Bank v. Halliday, 108 S. C. 116, 124,
93 S. E. 33 (1917).
1078. Witte v. Clark, 17 S.C. 313 (1881); Davis v. Butler, 107 S. C.
548, 93 S. E. 193 (1917).
1079. Note 44, supra.
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interest, and the whole property was, as the court found, appropriated to the partnership. At the time of the first transfer, the transferring partner's interest was subject to the lien
of judgments obtained against him. It was held that the partnership creditors' rights in the firm property were subordinate to the lien of the judgments, but that the judgment-holders should first exhaust the separate estate of their debtor.
The rendition or recovery of a judgment does not per se
create a lien.107 9a Accordingly, in the application of firm assets to the payment of firm debts where the property is in possession of a court for distribution, priority is not to be accorded to a judgment creditor over general creditors of the
firm unless the judgment has been perfected as a lien. The
preference which is given by statute to judgment creditors
over simple creditors in the settlement of a decedent's estate
is not applicable to, or paralleled in, the application of the
property of a defunct partnership. 0 80
Claims Against the Separate Estate. Subsection (i) deals
with the order of claims against the separate estate, a matter
not entirely covered by subsection (b) which deals only with
the relative position of firm and separate creditors in the re.spective estates. In postponing firm creditors to separate
creditors, subsection (i) is necessarily congruous with subsection (h). As subsection (i) may affect the estate of a deceased partner, it is consistent with Section 36(4), which
provides that the individual property of a deceased partner
shall be liable to partnership obligations "but subject to the
payment of his separate debts."
Insofar as the whole of subsection (i) relates to the estate
of a bankrupt partner-and, for that matter, insofar as the
whole of Section 40 does also-its provisions are not to be regarded seriously, as it is patent that, whether or not they are
1079a. As to real estate, on entry. § 743(1), S. C. CODE (1942). But
while effective as a lien only from date of entry, the duration of the

lien is marked from the date of its rendition. Harvey v. Gibson, 190 S. C.

98, 2 S. E. 2d 385 (1939). As to personal property, judgment constitutes
lien from time of levy (following entry and execution). § 744(1), S. C.

CODE (1942). See Powers v. Fidelity & Dep. Co., 180 S. C. 501, 186 S. E.
523 (1936). Prior to the adoption of the Code of Procedure of 1870,
the lien on personal property was created by lodgment of execution. See
State v. McCar-y, 120 S. C. 361, 113- S. E. 275 (1922) ; Warren v. Jones,
9 S. C. 288 (1877).
1080. Chalmers v. Turnipseed, note 295, supra. For the terms of the
statute, see note 1086, infra.
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consistent with the Bankruptcy Act (and on this score no
comment is made), the Federal law will control. 0 8' The Uniform Partnership Act and the Bankruptcy Act may furnish
useful analogies for each other, but in its own field each is
dominant.
Looking first to the relative position of firm and separate
creditors in the separate estate, it is manifest that the considerations concerning them under Priorities between Firm
and Separate Creditors will govern. Hence, it may be said
that, as to South Carolina law, the older rule which preferred
separate creditors to firm creditors has been restored, and
108 2
the later pre-Act rule has been superseded.
Among the separate creditors who are given priority by
subsection (i) (I) are to be included partners whose claims
arise out of transactions not connected with, or arising out
of, the partnership. That they may thus compete with other
separate creditors under the circumstances is a necessary deduction from subsection (i) (III), which puts in the least
favored position the claims of partners by way of contribution. 1 88 South Carolina law is probably changed by the Act
since it has been held that a claim by a partner for contribution against a deceased partner's estate, 1084 and the claim of
an assignee of partnership assets against such an estate for
obligations owing to the firm, 08 5 have equal rank with those
of other separate creditors. With the passage of the Act,
partners can share with separate creditors only if they have
claims not referable to the partnership; if their claims arise
out of firm transactions, they are relegated to the inferior
position set by subsection (i) (III).
In the distribution of a deceased partner's estate, the important question arises as to the effect of the change in priorities introduced by the Act upon the statutory order of

1081. See Titus v. Maxwell, note 1033, supra.
1082. For the earlier cases, see note 1051, supra; for the later cases,
now superseded by the Act. see note 1059, supra, and the text.
1083. That partners are included in subsection (i) (I) where the claim
is based on a non-partnership concern, see MECHEM, PARTNERSHIP, §
456; CRANE, PARTNERSHIP, § 95; CRANE, The Uniform PartnershipAct,

a Criticism,28 HARV. L. R. 762, 787 (1915) ; LEWIS, The Uniform Partnership Act, a Reply, 29 HARv. L. R. 291, 307 (1916).
1084. Stokes v. Hodges, note 65, supra-partner entitled to subrogation and contribution on paying firm debts. As to subrogation, see under
Priorities between Firm and Separate Creditors, this Section.
1085. Wilson v. McConnell, note 380, supra.
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payment of the debts of a decedent. 10 6 The statute which
fixes the order bases priority upon the nature of the obligation, and does not disturb antecedent liens-that is, liens
created before death. 10 7 The importance of the problem lies
in determining whether a firm obligation of a higher rank
under the statute-for example, a judgment debt-would
take precedence over a separate creditor's claim of inferior
rank-such as a simple contract debt.
At a time when the pre-existing rule allowing partnership
creditors to share pro rata with separate creditors was in
force, it was held that a firm creditor whose claim had been
reduced to judgment was superior to a separate judgment
creditor whose judgment was subsequent in point of time. 08 8
The result, of course, was logical since firm creditors were
treated as equal with separate creditors. Under the earlier
rule, however, it was held that the statute stating priorities
for a decedent's debts did not govern priorities as between
separate and firm creditors, and that a firm creditor's demand
of a normally higher rank than that of the separate creditor
would give way until separate debts were paid. The reason
given was that although the statute "requires the debts [of
the decedent] to be paid in a particular order, it does not
meddle with the fund out of which they are to be paid, and
all that can be required is that each particular class should
be paid out of its appropriate fund, according to the terms
of the Act."' 08 9 The practice, according to the case from which
the quoted language is taken, was one of long and unques1086. § 8995, S. C. CODE: "The assets which come to the hands of an

executor or administrator, after proper allowance to the executor or ad-

ministrator, in a due course of administration, shall be applied to the
payment of his debts in the following order, that is to say: (1) Funeral

and other expenses of the last sickness, charges of probate, or letters

of administration. (2) Debts due to the public. (3) Judgments, mort-

gages, and executions-the oldest first. (4) Rent. (5) Bonds, debts by

specialty, and debts by simple contract. Mortgages, however, not to be
entitled to priority over rents and debts by specialty or by simple con-

tract, except as to the particular parts of the estate affected by the
liens of such mortgages. No preference shall be given among the creditors in equal degree, where there is a deficiency of assets, except ac-

cording to legal priorities."
1087. The cases on this point are numerous. See Weatherly v. Medlin,
141 S. C. 290, 139 S. E. 633 (1927); McConnell v. Barnes, 142 S. C.
112, 140 S. F. 310, 57 A. L. R.483 (1927) ; Purdy v. Strother, 184 S. C.
210, 192 S. E. 159 (1937).
1088. Gowan v. Tunno, note 381, supra. Under subsection (3) of §
8995, which was then of force also, an older judgment takeg precedence
over a later one.
1089. Sniffer v. Sass, note 738, supra, at 25.
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tioned standing. Thus, it was held that firm creditors whose
claims were represented by judgments would not-prevail over
separate creditors where claims were represented by bonds. 109 0
And it was also held that a firm debt represented by a judgment could not take precedence over separate creditors whose
claims ranked as simple contract debts. 109 1
The restoration of the earlier rule of distribution by subsections (h) and (i) must have the inevitable effect of making the statute governing application of a decedent's assets
inappropriate in favor of partnership creditors until all separate debts of whatever character and level have been paid,
due regard being had to perfected liens of firm creditors. To
put it another way, the restoration of the older rule of distribution revives at the same time the rule denying partnership
creditors the benefit of the statutory order of payment until
separate creditors have been satisfied. But aside from reaching this conclusion on the assumption that the reinstatement
of the older rule carries along with it the revival of the subordinate rule deferring partnership creditors without regard
to the nature of their demands, the language of subsections
(h) and (i), and that of Section 36(4), in their positive
declaration that separate creditors have priority in the separate estate would appear to fashion the same result. If the
statute and the Act are of doubtful consistency (and it was
stated in one of the earlier cases that the rule of priorities as
between firm and separate creditors is "not incompatible"
with the statute),1092 the Act, as the latest expression of the
legislative will and by virtue of its repealer clause, must be
regarded as overriding the statute as it affects priorities between the two classes of creditors.
During the existence of the now repealed rule of priorities,
a firm creditor, while compelled to resort first to firm assets
before being permitted to share ratably with separate creditors, proved his claim against the deceased partner's estate
1090.

Woddrop v. Price, note 1051,

supra. This case, decided in 1811,

states that on the point "a Judge sitting here is not at liberty to doubt."
Under subsection (3) of § 8995, a judgment debt is, and was then, superior to a bond debt. Prior to 1874 bond debts were superior to simple
contract debts. In that year bond and specialty debts were put on a

parity with simple contracts (15

STAT.

609), and both have equal rank

to-day.
1091. Sniffer v. Sass, note 738, supra. Judgment debts are now, and

were then, superior to simple contract debts.
1092. Sniffer v. Sass, note 738, supra, at 25.
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for the full amount. The reason was that under the statute
prescribing the order of payment of a decedent's debts, demands against the estate were presentable in the condition in
10 93 It
which they existed at the date of the decedent's death.
is probable that the same course would be followed today,
since there is the same general requirement as to the condition of the demand in relation to-the time of its determination-i.e., the time of the debtor's death. Filing a demand for
the full amount would not be a double proof-for, as has been
seen, that term denotes distinct demands. In any event, payment out of the estate would await tne prior satisfaction of
individual debts, and amounts realized on the application of
firm assets would have to be placed to the reduction of the
claim.
Since a firm creditor is a creditor of the individuals comprising the firm, it is obvious that presentment of a claim
against the partnership estate does not debar a claim against
the separate estate; but even where the demand is actually
an individual-and not a partnership-demand, the filing of
it as a claim against the partnership of which the deceased
individual partner was a member does not prevent its being
1094
proved against the separate estate.
SECTION 41. Liability of Persons Continuing the Business in Certain Cases.
(1) When any new partner is admitted into an existing partnership, or when any partner retires and assigns (or the representative of the deceased partner assigns) his rights in partnership property to two or more
of the partners, or to one or more of the partners and
one or more third persons, if the business is continued
without liquidation of the partnership affairs, creditors
of the first or dissolved partnership are also creditors
of the partnership so continuing the business.
(2) When all but one partner retire and assign (or
1093. Wilson v. McConnell, note 380, supra.
1094. McIntyre v. MeClenaghan, 12 S. C. 185 (1879)-partner in firm
of attorneys appointed agent of assignees for benefit of creditors and
failed to account. A claim was filed against the firm after the agent's
death, and a claim was also filed against his estate. Held, latter
claim provable, except that if the claim as filed against the firm estate
had been paid in full it would not be provable against the private estate.
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the representative of a deceased partner assigns) their
rights in partnership property to the remaining partner, who continues the business without liquidation of
partnership affairs, either alone or with others, creditors of the dissolved partnership are also creditors of
the person or partnership so continuing the business.
(3) When any partner retires or dies and the business of the dissolved partnership is continued as set
forth in paragraphs (1) and (2) of this section, with
the consent of the retired partners or the representative
of the deceased partner, but without any assignment of
his right in partnership property, rights of creditors of
the dissolved partnership and of the creditors of the person or partnership continuing the business shall be as
if such assignment had been made.
(4) When all the partners or their representatives assign their rights in partnership property to one or more
third persons who promise to pay the debts and who continue the business of the dissolved partnership, creditors
of the dissolved partnership are also creditors of the person or partnership continuing the business.
(5) When any partner wrongfully causes a dissolution and the remaining partners continue the business
under the provisions of Section 38 (2b), either alone or
with others, and without liquidation of the partnership
affairs, creditors of the dissolved partnership are also
creditors of the person or partnership continuing the
business.
(6) When a partner is expelled and the remaining partners continue the business either alone or with others,
without liquidation of the partnership affairs, creditors
of the dissolved partnership are also creditors of the person or partnership continuing the business.
(7) The liability of a third person becoming a partner
in the partnership continuing the business, under this
section, to the creditors of the dissolved partnership
shall be satisfied out of partnership property only.
(8) When the business of a partnership after dissolution is continued under any conditions set forth in this
section the creditors of the dissolved partnership, as
against the separate creditors of the retiring or deceased
partner or the representative of the deceased partner,

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol4/iss2/4

38

Karesh: Partnership Law and the Uniform Partnership Act in South Carolina
THE UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT

have a prior right to any claim of the retired partner
or the representative of the deceased partner against the
person or partnership continuing the business, on account
of the retired or deceased partner's interest in the dissolved partnership or on account of any consideration
promised for such interest or for his right in partnership property.
(9) Nothing in this section shall be held to modify
any right of creditors to set aside any assignment on the
ground of fraud.
(10) The use by the person or partnership continuing
the business of the partnership name, or the name of a
deceased partner as part thereof, shall not of itself make
the individual property of the deceased partner liable for
any debts contracted by such person or partnership.
In their comment to this Section the Commissioners state
that, "The Section as a whole deals primarily with the rights
of creditors when a new partner is admitted, or a partner is
expelled or dies, and the business is continued without liquidation of the partnership dissolved by the change in personnel." The Section while lengthy is in the main a breakdown
into factual situations to meet a common thesis: that on a
continuance of the business without liquidation all the creditors of the business-those before dissolution, and those during its continuance-are to be treated alike. "The Uniform
Partnership Act proposes, in general, to regard all of the
creditors at the various stages as creditors of the business at
any stage, when the business is in fact continuous, notwithstanding the changes in the personnel of the members."'01 95
In treating as unimpaired the rights of partnership creditors
despite changes in personnel, the Act, by this Section, follows
1096
closely an entity concept.
1095. MECHEM, PARTNERSHIP, § 462. The draftsman's comment is that
"In short, the Section recognizes the fact that the business has been one

business from the start, and that those who have extended credit to
the different partnerships continuing it should all, on the failure of
the business, have equal rights in the property devoted to the business."

LEwis, The Uniform PartnershipAct, 24 YALE L. J. 617, 636 (1915).

See CRANE, PARTNERSHIP, § 88: "Under [the U. P. A.] the old creditors
are on a parity with the new in that they can bring suit against the

new firm, levy execution on property, and share in its distribution in
the event of insolvency."
1096. CRANE, PARTNERSHIP, § 3, n. 30.
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The Section is designed to remove uncertainties in the law
as it deals with the rights of the creditors of the dissolved
firm when the business is continued without liquidation. Its
promulgation is dictated by the unsatisfactory results flowing from the theory that every change in the membership of
a firm works a dissolution-a matter that has already been
discussed-and that unless there has been assumption of
firm liabilities by the new firm as a firm, the equity of the
creditors of the dissolved firm in the partnership property
(now owned by the new firm) is at an end. Under this theory
all that is left to the old creditors is the personal liability of
the original partners; and as between the creditors of the
dissolved firm and the creditors of the new, the firm assets
would be available preferentially to the latter, the former being remitted solely to the character of separate creditors of
whatever partners remained in the continuing business. These
and similar inequitable effects the Section removes.
South Carolina authority on the legal problems disposed of
by the Section is non-existent. Some of the factual combinations are present in the cases: the retiring and the assuming
partner; the incoming partner; the retiring and the incoming partner; the continuance of business by the surviving
partner. These occurrences have already been observed. In
none of the cases, however, is the issue of the status of the
old creditors as to the property of the new firm presented.
The Section therefore furnishes fresh, not different, law on
the problems. Since the matters the Section covers are not
dealt with locally, it may be worthwhile to comment on some
portions of the Section, the comments being largely extracted
from the Commissioners' note to it.
In subsection (1) there is an assortment of facts. The
start is made with the firm of A, B and C. The addition of D
to the firm creates a new firm. The creditors of A, B and C
are also the creditors of A, B, C and D, and participate
equally with the new creditors of that firm. D as incoming
partner is liable personally only if he has assumed payment
of the former firm's debts (see Section 17, and subsection (7)
of this Section), but whether he assumes or not, his contribution to the new firm is subject to the old obligations. If all
the members of the new firm thus formed assume the payment of the old firm's debts, the question whether their liability is that only of individuals or as a firm is settled by the
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subsection, in that whether they assume as one or the other
the property of the firm is available to the old creditors along
with the new.
Further in subsection (1) is the case of the retiring and
assigning partner, or the assigning representative. A, of
A, B and C, assigns to B and C (or A's representative so assigns). The new firm is B and C. Or A (or his representative)
assigns to B and C and D; or he assigns to B and D; or to
C and D. In these situations the new firm is B, C and D.-The
creditors of the dissolved firm are also the creditors of the
new firm of B and C; or of B, C and D.
Subsection (2) deserves the Commissioners' comment nearly in full: "When all the partners assign to one partner, the
partnership creditors are, under this paragraph, the separate
creditors of the partner continuing the business, where he
continues the business alone, whether such partner promises
to pay the debts of the dissolved partnership or not. If he
takes one or more partners and they continue the business
with property of the dissolved partnership, the creditors of
the dissolved partnership are the creditors of the partnership
continuing the business." Thus, if A and B (or the representative of a deceased one of them), of the firm of A, B
and C, assign to C, the old creditors continue as the creditors
of C with or without assumption of debts by him. If A and
B (or the representative of a deceased one of them) assign
to C and D, the creditors of the dissolved firm become the
creditors of C and D as a firm with or without assumption.
D's personal liability depends upon whether he has assumed
the old debts.
Subsection (3) is declared by the Commissioners to be an
extension of the principle of the first and second subsections,
and for the purpose it treats as tantamount to an assignment
the consent of the retiring partner or the representative of
a deceased partner. It is not clear whether by "consent" the
Commissioners mean consent without an intent to assign, or
consent as indicative of an intent to assign unaccompanied
by present assignment; for in their note they speak of the
situation produced when there is no "formal asignment" and
say, "The neglect (empasis supplied) of the retiring partners
or the representatives of the deceased partner should not
as at present create inexecrable confusion between the credi-
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tors of the first and second partnership in regard to the respective rights in the property employed in the business. 1096a
As a collateral matter, the question of the right of the personal representative of a deceased partner to assign or consent arises in connection with subsections (1), (2), (3). Undoubtedly, if the will of a deceased partner authorizes his
executor to dispose of his interest, such an assignment could
be made without more; and it is quite probable that if the deceased partner had agreed in the partnership articles that his
interest should be transferred to the surviving partners, at
the choice of the latter, the executor or administrator could,
without prior judicial approval, make the necessary assignment. Absent these permissive features, the executor or administrator could, of course, seek the sanction of a court to
assign or consent for the interests of the estate. Whether
without court approval he could make the assignment depends on the law of administration of estates. While at common law the representative had the unfettered power to dispose of the personal assets of his decedent, the right in South
Carolina has been restricted by statute, and it is necessary
that prior judicial consent be obtained to such a sale (except
in the case of an executor authorized by the will to sell).1097
The statutes have been held, however, to apply only to "personal chattels or visible effects," and not to choses in action.1098 If it be considered that the interest of a deceased
partner in the firm is a chose in action (and it has been indicated previously that it may be),1099 the representative
would need no judicial authorization to assign, or to give
his consent to a continuance of the business. It must be
admitted, however, (and recommended) that until the matter

1096a. In Zach v. Shulman, 213 Ark. 213, 210 S. W. 2d 1242, 2 A. L. R.

2d 1078 (1948), it was held that the continuation of a business by the
surviving partner by agresment with the deceased partner's representative gave no right to the survivor to demand an assignment. The court
was construing Section 42, which ties in with Section 41. It would appear, therefore, that consent need not be identified with an- agreement
to assign.
1097. §§ 9059-9061, S. C. CODE (1942).
1098. Rhame v. Lewis, 13 RicHARDSON's EQuITy 269 (S. C. 1867);

Reynolds v. Reese, 23 S. C. 438 (1885); Chapman v. City Council, 30
S. C. 549, 9 S. E. 591, 3 L. R. A. 311 (1888).

1099. See, under Section 26, Conversion of Realty to Personalty, con-

cluding paragraph.
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is more clearly defined the representative should seek court
approval." 00
Subsection (4) deals with transfers by all the partners
or their representatives to one or more third persons who assume the debts of the firm. Without such an assumption, of
course, neither the assignees nor the assigned property are
liable for the old debts; the validity of the transfer would
depend only upon the law of fraudulent transfers or the Bulk
Sales Act." 0 ' If the purchasers assume payment of the firm
debts, they become liable to the creditors, a result which in
a third party beneficiary jurisdiction (such as South Carolina) follows as a matter of course. The subsection is designed to establish that where the transfer is made to third
persons as partners, who promise to pay firm debts, there is
created in the creditors not merely the right to sue but the
right to look to the transferred property on a parity with
new creditors of the firm and to the exclusion-or to the subordination-of the separate creditors of the members of the
new firm.
Subsections (5) and (6) are not commented upon by the
Commissioners but their substance is clearly compatible with
the remainder of the Section, for in both cases the business
continues without liquidation. If A, of the firm of A, B and
C, wrongfully dissolves the partnership and the business is
continued by B and C; or if A is expelled and the business
is continued by B and C-in each of these the rights of the
creditors of the dissolved firm continue in the firm property.
The comment of the Commissioners to subsection (8)
states the purpose to remove existing uncertainties in the
law. The allocation to the old firm's creditors of the retiring
partner's or the representative's right of payment in preference to the separate creditors, or the representative, is justified on the ground that there has been a sale of the "property rights in the partnership before settling with the credi1100. In Blumer Brewing Corp. v. Mayer, 223 Wis. 540, 269 N. W. 693,
111 A. L. R. 1087 (1937), the court, in applying subsection (3), declared
that at common law such consent would exist, basing it on the com-

mon law right to assign. In South Carolina it would seem that the extent to which the representative could consent would depend upon the
extent to which his common law power to assign has been affected or
curtailed by statute.
1101. Commissioners' note to subsection (4); CRANE, PARTNERsHIP,
§ 79. Subsection (9) specifical!y provides that nothing in Section 40

shall be held to modify the rights of parties to set aside any assignment
on the ground of fraud.
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tors of the partnership, and, therefore, the creditors should
have an equitable lien on the consideration of the sale as
against the separate creditors of the retiring partner, or as
against the representatives of a deceased partner who have
sold the rights of their decedent to the persons continuing the
business." Professor Crane explains the matter by saying
that, ordinarily, a former partner who is a creditor of a partnership for the purchase price of his interest is entitled to
distribution in the partnership estate on a parity with other
creditors, but that the situation is complicated by the existence of unpaid creditors of the old partnership where claims
by assumption or otherwise become obligations of the new
partnership, "and being creditors of the retired partner, they
have grounds to object to his competing with his own creditors. The Uniform Partnership Act has provided that any
dividend credited to the retired partner, or deceased partner's estate, shall be distributed to the unpaid creditors of
1 02
the former partnership.""

SECTION 42. Rights of Retiring or Estate of Deceased
Partner When the Business is Continued. When any partner retires or dies, and the business is continued under
any of the conditions set forth in section 41 (1, 2, 3, 5,
6), or section 38 (2b), without any settlement of accounts as between him or his estate and the person or
partnership continuing the business, unless otherwise
agreed, he or his legal representative as against such
persons or partnership may have the value of his interest at the date of dissolution ascertained, and shall receive as an ordinary creditor an amount equal to the
value of his interest in the dissolved partnership with
interest, or, at his option or at the option of his legal
representative, in lieu of interest, the profits attributable
to the use of his right in the property of the dissolved
partnership; provided that the creditors of the dissolved
partnership as against the separate creditors, or the representative of the retired or deceased partner, shall have
priority on any claim arising under this section, as provided by section 41(8) of this act.
1102. CRANE, PARTNERSHIP, § 93.
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It has been stated that the provisions of Section 42 are a
restatement of prior law; 03 and it has also been said that
while the subsections to which the Section refers as containing the conditions for its involvement are based on consent,
the Section also applies where there has been no consent of
the retiring partner or the representative of a deceased partner to the continuance of the partnership business." 04 The rule
which the Section asserts is a rather obvious-though greatly
extended-use of the principle in the law of trusts that
gives a beneficiary the choice of interest or profits on the use
of the trust property by the trustee, or its mingling with his
own." 05 It is to be noted that the profits optionally available
are not computed on the basis of the original agreement of
partnership for sharing profits but are to be calculated according to the capital employed.
South Carolina law on the subject, as it is dealt with under
the precise factual events of the Section, is meager; but there
is substantial agreement with the rule affording the choice
of interest or profits when the business is continued on the
death of a partner. In Schenk v. Lewis,n' 0 6 where the surviving partners instead of expeditiously liquidating the business
continued it, the court said:
"If the surviving partner, instead of reasonably performing this duty [prompt liquidation], should continue
to conduct the business,' he may be compelled to account
for the profits thereof. 'If they (surviving partners) go
on with the business under the credit, and risking the
effects of the firm, and profits result, they will be bound
to account for those profits as belonging to the firm, and
they are liable to be so charged with interest on the
funds they use, though no profits, or even a loss, is made.'
Riddle v. Whitehill, 135 U. S. 621; 10 Sup. Ct. 924; 34
Ed. 283."
The demand in this case was for interest, and under the rule
announced interest was allowed instead of unasked for profits.
1103. Cahill v. Haff, 248 N. Y. 37, 162 N. E. (1928). See note, 2
A. L. R. 2d 1084, 1086, 1095.
1104. Froess v. Froess, 289 Pa. 69, 137 Atl. 124 (1927). See note, 2
A. L. R. 2d 1084, 1095.
The cases in which Section 42 has been construed are collected in 2
A. L. R. 2d 1084.
1105. In re Eisenlohr's Estate, 258 Pa. 431, 102 Atl. 115 (1917).
1106. Note 151, supra, at 244.
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Where profits earned after dissolution are attributable to
skill rather than the use of capital, there is no choice of interest or profits, and for that matter the representative of a deceased partner cannot demand a division of such profits."0 7
SECTION 43. Accrual of Actions. The right to an account of his interest shall accrue to any partner, or his
legal representative, as against the winding up partners or the surviving partners or the person or partnership continuing the business, at the date of dissolution,
in the absence of any agreement to the contrary.
The purpose of Section 43 in stating when the right to account accrues is to fix the starting point for the Statute of
Limitations against an action to account by a partner or his
representative against the surviving or winding up partner
or the person or partnership continuing the business. Accordingly, the Statute begins to run upon dissolution, and it is
not postponed until some subsequent period, such as a reasonable time after dissolution, or the rendering of an account,
or so long as partnership affairs are unsettled. 0 8 The importance of the Section lies in the fact that although the winding up partner and the surviving partner are fiduciaries--or
trustees-the rule in trusts denying the applicability of the
Statute of Limitations in actions by beneficiaries against
trustees is not followed." 09
Since the Section deals only with the winding up and surviving partners and the continuing persons or partnership,
it may be well to look into the larger field--embracing the
partners generally-as it appears in South Carolina.
An action for accounting is an equitable action, and it has
been stated in one South Carolina case that because it is
equitable the Statute of Limitations is not applicable,"' 0 but
1107. Carroll v. Alston, note 120, supra; Carrere v. Whaley, note 534,
supra. See discussion of these cases under Section 18, Division of
Profits, and other material on the subject under the same topic.
1108. CRANE, PARTNERSHIP, § 87; 29 HARv. L. R. 291, 309 (1916).
1109. 28 HARV. L. R. 762, 786-788; (1915); 29 HARV. L. R. 291, 309
(1916). In the former article Professor Crane objects to the rule of the
Section on the ground that it vitiates the principle applicable to trustees; in the second article, Dr. Lewis, the draftsman, admits the relationship but asserts that the purpose nevertheless was as stated-to
accrue the action on dissolution.
1110. Wagner v. Sanders, note 60, supra, at 89.
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the observation was made as a concession in argument, and
in the light of the numerous cases in which the Statute has
been entertained the remark is not to be taken as a statement of the law. The law is to the contrary: the Statute of
Limitations can be interposed as a defense."" During the
existence of the partnership, however, the Statute-and it
is the general Statute of Limitations-has no currency. Its
commencement is upon dissolution."' 2 The reason for its inapplicability while the partnership is undissolved and for
its operation afterwards is thus stated in Montgomery v.
Montgomery :1113
It is perfectly obvious that, so long as the partnership continues, the possession of one is the possession of
both, and consequently the Statute of Limitations cannot
be interposed by either. So soon as the partnership is
dissolved, this joint tenancy is ended, and the partners
then stand as other individuals in society, each claiming
for himself.
It is clear from the language quoted that on voluntary dissolution, where there is no appointment of a liquidating partner,
the Statute begins its operation. Section 43, while it does not
mention such a case, cannot be opposed to it, for if the Statute commences in favor of a winding up or liquidating partner, on dissolution a fortiori a non-liquidating partner will
be in the same position.
While the Statute will run as between non-liquidating partners from the time of dissolution, it would appear that where
a partial settlement is made at the time and other settlements
are made thereafter the currency of the Statute is destroyed
by each settlement or account, very much as an acknowledgment acts to toll it."' 4 And where after dissolution a partner offers to arbitrate or to render an account, this is not

1111. Montgomery v. Montgomery, note 652, supra; Boyd v. Munro,

note 759, supra; McBrayer v. Mills, note 825, supra. All the other cases
noted under this topic in which the Statute has been involved necessarily imply the same proposition.
1112. Burden v. MeElmoyle, note 693, supra; Montgomery v. Montgomery, note 652, supra; Mills v. Carrier, note 644b, supra; Jones v. Smith,
note 176, supra; McBrayer v. Mills, note 825, supra.
1113. Note 652, supra.

1114. Eakin v. Knox, note 552, mpra.
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such an acknowledgment of indebtedness as will give the Statute a new starting point."' 5
The status of the winding up partner in South Carolina
is apparently changed by Section 43. In Montgomery v. Montgomery,1 ' 6 it is stated that although on dissolution the partners "stand as other individuals in society", a "direct" trust
may be created by the designation of a partner to liquidate
as to which the Statute will not run, but that when an account
purporting to be final is furnished by the liquidator the trust
is thereupon at an end and the Statute commences. Similarly,
in Boyd v. Munro,"' 7 where one of two surviving partners of
a firm of three undertook to collect the assets of the firm (including certain notes) and acknowledged that he held them
for the benefit of himself and the other partner, it was held
that even if the assumed obligation to collect made the partner a technical trustee, the filing in the Probate Court by the
administrator of his estate of an inventory showing the particular notes in suit as belonging to the deceased partner was
an avowed and open repudiation of the trust which would
put the Statute in motion. In these cases it is apparent that
when a liquidator is appointed, the Statute has no operation
until there has been a purported termination of the trust or
its repudiation; under the Act, the Statute starts in favor
of the liquidator at dissolution. It should be added, however,
that, even under the Act, if an account were rendered by the
liquidator showing an indebtedness by him, the Statute would
be tolled and the trust obligation recognized or decreed."' 8
On dissolution by death of a partner, the Statute of Limitations goes into operation."' 9 Certainly this is true as to an
action by the survivor against the deceased partner's representatives."2 0 The law is not so clear as to causes of action
against the survivor, although there is a fair intimation from
1115. Burden v. McElmoyle, note 693, supra. For a similar result where
the partner offered to arbitrate but denied liability, see Montgomery v.
Montgomery, note 652, supra.
1116. Note 652, supra.
1117. Note 759, supra.
1118. 29 HARv. L. R. 291, 311 (1916). This is the draftsman's comment.
1119. Mills v. Carrier, note 644b, supra. See note, 96 A. L. R. 441;
157 A. L. R. 1114.
1120. Mills v. Carrier, note 644b, supra; McBrayer v. Mills, note 825,
supra. There is a difference of opinion as to the effect of non-claim
statutes upon the claim of a surviving partner against the deceased
partner's estate. See note, 96 A. L. R. 441, 449; 157 A. L. R. 1114, 1117.
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general language employed that the Statute is operative on
death in favor of the survivor as well as in favor of the
21
representatives of the deceased partner."
22
In Duncan v. Westerlund,"1 a firm was dissolved by the
death of one of the partners, the plaintiffs' intestate, in 1880.
In 1887 the administratrix of the deceased partner brought
an action for accounting against the survivor. The proceedings resulted, unfortunately for the administratrix, in a judgment for the survivor for a balance shown to be due him. In
1917 the United States paid the representative of the surviving partner a sum owing the firm as compensation for the.
use of the firm's premises by the Federal authorities in the
"War Between the Sections." The claim was not reckoned
in the prior judicial accounting. In this action to recover onehalf of the amount so paid, the plaintiffs contended that their
estate's liability to pay the amount adjudged due to the survivor was barred by the Statute. It was held that the survivor's representative had the right to retain the whole
amount on the ground that the plaintiffs, whose indebtedness exceeded the portion sought, should first pay the amount
due the survivor, the court applying the doctrine of equitable retainer-or something analogous to it-to allow the
assertion of a claim by the survivor which might have been
barred by the passage of time. It is to be noted here that the
court did not dispose of the case by declaring the Statute of
Limitations to have run in favor of the survivor-and it was
not necessary to do so-, and it is possible that this case contains an inference that so long as there are unsettled debts due
to the partnership the Statute does not run in the survivor's
favor. Under Section 43 it would seem that the survivor could
2
interpose the Statute as a bar."" 3
As in other equitable actions, the relief sought through
accounting may be lost by laches in unreasonable and prej24
udicial delay."
1121. McBrayer v. Mills, note 825, supra.
1122. Note 565, supra.
1123. The draftsman says, "Wheresthe property is received by a
winding-up or surviving partner more than the statutory period, if any,
after dissolution, the claim is barred, as it should be barred, if the.
partner making the claim has never insisted- on an account." 29 HARv.
L. R. 291, 311 (1916).
1124. Wagner v. Sanders, note 60, supra-laches a bar to actior
brought in 1895 where death dissolved firm in 1872 and administratrix
appointed in 1873; Brown v. Smith, note 523, supra-laches bar to re-
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Where relief is denied in a partnership action because of
laches, the denial may be made by the court on its own motion, without the laches being pleaded or urged by the deLimitations is to
fendant.1 1 25 When, however, the Statute of
26
pleaded."
be
must
it
defense,
a
as
be used

PART VII.
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
SECTION 44.1127 When Act Takes Effect. This Act shall
, one thoutake effect on the --- day of----------sand nine hundred and----------SECTION 45. Legislation Repealed. All Acts or parts
of Acts inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed.
As pointed out in the opening pages, the Act became effective on its approval by the Governor on February 13, 1950.
It should be noted that neither Section 44 (45 in the South
Carolina Act) nor any other Section states that the Act is
to be effective only as to partnerships formed after its adoption. Section 4(5) provides that the Act shall not impair obligations of contracts entered into before its effective date nor
affect "any action or proceedings begun or right accrued before this Act takes effect." The Act, accordingly, does operate
upon partnerships formed before as well as after its approval,
subject to the limitations imposed by Section 4(5). There
will, of course, be difficulty in given cases involving pre-Act
partnerships in determining whether particular transactions
-between the partners or with third persons-fall within
the limitation of Section 4(5), as well as whether they run
counter to constitutional prohibitions against impairment of
contracts. The difficulty-as severe as it may be--is no more
covery of interest on balance struck. In other cases the defense of
laches was not sustained on the facts. Eakln v. Knox, note 552, supra;
Jones v. Smith, note 176, supra; Edwards v. Johnson, note 80, supra.
1125. Wagner v. Sanders, note 60, supra.
1126. Karres v. Pappas, note 578, supra.
1127. In the Act as adopted by the South Carolina General Assembly
Sections 44 and 45 are transposed. Section 44 in the South Carolina
version reads as Section 45 in the original Act, except that the heading
is simply "Repeal." Section 45 in the South Carolina Act is captioned
"Time Effective" and reads: "This Act shall take effect upon the approval of the Governor."
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extraordinary than that in other types of retrospective legislation and is to be resolved in the same manner.
As of this writing, five cases have been decided in the South
Carolina Supreme Court on partnership matters since the approval of the Act. Four of them 28 make no mention of the
Act; and in none of these was that necessary, since the litigation was in progress before the Act's inception, and by Section 4(5) the Act does not apply to proceedings instituted
before its effective date. The fifth case 2 9 was started after
the Act's passage, and related to a transaction between a
third person and alleged partners. The Court's notice was directed to the Act. (apparently on oral argument), and it
disposed of the matter by saying merely, "Attention is called
to the Uniform Partnership Act * * * which, however, does
not affect this case since the transaction arose prior to its
passage." In its setting, and for the purposes of the case, the
statement is undoubtedly correct, but it is not to be taken as
a formula to test the application of the Act. To have every
transaction before the Act's adoption fall without its operation would be virtually to limit the Act to partnerships
formed after its effective date, for even the formation of the
partnership in itself constitutes a transaction. The amenability of any transaction to the Act, whether before or after
its passage, will depend upon whether the Act's application
would impair rights accrued or contract obligations existing
before it became law.
In many parts of this article consideration has been given
to relevant statutes. Where there has been seeming or possible inconsistency between a particular statute and the Act,
notice has been taken of it. Conclusions as to the impact of
the Act upon the various statutes can be drawn from the context of the material in which the respective statutes are referred to or considered.

1128. Trexier v. McIntrye, note 7, supra; Heretis v. Taggs, note 61,
supra; Virginia Hotel Co. v. Dusenberry, note 77a, supra, now reported

in 218 S. C. 524, 63 S. E. 2d 483; Romanus v. Biggs, note 138, supra.

1129. Nachman-Rhodes, Inc. v. Lightner, note 375a, supra, now reported in 219 S. C. 167, 64 S. E. 2d 393.
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SUPPLEMENT
This supplement is actually a collection of errata and addenda. The installments of this article were submitted for
publication piecemeal and not as parts of a completed manuscript. Only after the respective installments (other than the
last) appeared in print did the errors, some of them fairly
obvious, come to light, having escaped detection in copy and
proof. Additional material is inserted either to supply omissions or as supplement. Changes and additions are in both
footnotes and text.
Footnote No.
6. Add: Section numberings in the official version of the Act are retained in the South Carolina version, except that Sections 44 and
45 are transposed. The language in the Section headings as they
appear in this article is that used in the official- version. The language in the Section headings of the South Carolina version is not
identical with the official version but is a paraphrase.
42. Add: Trexler v. MeIntrye, note 7, supra.
43. Omit 12 Am. 649.
52. Change Wilson v. Wilson to Ex Parte Wilson.
99. Add tbocases: Schenk v. Lewis, 125 S. C. 228, 252, 118 S. E. 631
(1923).
106. Add: Edwards v. Johnson, note 80, supra, at 95: "The test of a
partnership is .the agreement to engage in a common business or
adventure and to share the profits therefrom, as well as the expense or losses incident thereto."
142. Add: Latham v. Harby, 50 S. C. 428, 27 S. E. 862 (1897)-principal and agent.
149. Change 59 to 57.
186. Add as second sentence: For like result under similar facts, see
Wilson v. McConnell, 9 RICHARDSON'S EQUITY 500, 510, 511
(S. C. 1857).
195. Change Jeffery v. Ehrhardt, 200 S. C. 519, to Jeffery v. Ehrhardt,
210 S. C. 519.
196. Add: Edwards v. Johnson, note 80, supra, at 99.
237. Change 233 to 236.
269. Change Wiesenfeld v. Stern to Wiesenfeld v. Byrd.
295. Change Chambers v. Turnipseed to Chalmers v. Turnipseed.
342. Change § 685 to § 6850.
355. Insert at beginning: Halls v. Coe.
388. Add: Allen v. Cooley, 53 S. C. 77, 30 S. E. 721 (1898).
470. Change DeGroot v. Steinmyer to DeGroot v. Darby.
488. Add: See, also, Kinsler v. McCants, note 196, supra, at 48.
521. Add: Huffman v. Huffman, note 65, supra. Although these are
cases in which a new partner was admitted into the firm, the fact
is that in each the new partner succeeded a retiring partner. Roach
v. Ivey, 7 S. C. 434 (1875) is a true case of an incoming partner
without retirment of any other partner.
531. Add: as to earnings by receiver liquidating firm, see Kennedy v.
Hill, note 529, supra, at 468, 469.
539. Add: But while a partner may be entitled to return of capital, property bought by the partnership with the capital he has furnished
does not belong to him but to the firm. Metz v. Commercial Bank,
note 15, supra,at 240.
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548. Add: Gadsden v. Carson, 9 RICHARDSON'S EQUITY 252, 268 (S. C.
1857).
549. Add as second sentence: These cases are cases equally involving
contribution.
555. Add: MeBrayer v. Mills, 62 S. C. 36, 39 S. E. 788 (1901)-note
by firm to partner.
641. Add: Latham v. Harby, 50 S. C. 428, 27 S. E. 862 (1897).
646. Add: As to action to rescind for fraud, see Section 39.
647. Add: In Latham v. Harby, 50 S. C. 428, 27 S. E. 862 (1897), where
the plaintiff alleged a partnership and asked an accounting, and
the proof showed no partnership existed but that there was another relation, it was held error to dismiss the complaint for want
of equitable jurisdiction, as under the allegations the plaintiff was
entitled to judgment on thp law side of the court and jurisdiction
should have been retained for that purpose.
664. Add: As to rescission for fraud, see Section 39.
681. Add: Boozer v. Webb, note 186, supra.
684. Change Note 399 to 53 S. C. 414, 31 S. E. 634 (1898).
688a. Add: Brown v. Chandler, 50 S. C. 385, 27 S. E. 868 (1897); McLucas v. Durham, not 552, supra. The partners may, subject to the
rules, bind themselves by arbitration. Coleman v. Coleman, note
552, supra. But where the rules are not conformed to or the arbitration is not impartial, the award is not binding. Cothran v. Knox,
note 595, supra.
692. Add as second citation: Cothran v. Knox, note 595, supra.
718. Add: Duncan v. Westerlund, note 565, supra.
837. Add: Brown v. Bradley, note 736, supra. -

(References are to pages. (3) and (4) denote
volume of
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Page No.
(3) 229. Line 5, change conduct in the agency of the business to agency
in the conduct of the business.
(3) 381. Line 11, strike out not.
(3) 387. 8d and 2d lines from bottom, change Hall v. Young to Hull v.
YOung.00a
Add footnote 300a: Note 216, supra.
(3) 409. Insert at end of second paragraph:In Bates v. Cobb,383a where
a judgment was obtained against only one partner on a firm
debt (why it was not recovered against the other partner does
not appear) and nulla bona returned, it was held that it was
not necessary that the judgment creditors exhaust their legal
remedies against the other partners before resorting to an action
to set aside a fraudulent conveyance by the judgment debtor.
Add footnote 388a. 29 S. C. 395, 7 S. E. 343, 13 Am. St. Rep.
742 (1888).
(3) 410. Line 12, change subsection (b) to subsection (h).
(3) 442. 5th line from bottom, after "contract", add 535a.
Add footnote 535a: For further treatment of this case, see,
under Section 31, Dissolution in Contravention of Agreement.
(3) 451. Insert as next to last paragraph: A partner who after dissolution is compelled to pay a firm debt is entitled to interest on
the contributive share of the other partners from the date of
payment.sSa
Add footnote 585a: Eakin v. Knox, note 552, supra.
(3) 463. 3d line from bottom, change law of equity to law or equity.
(4) 65. In heading of Section 28, change Changing to Charging.
(4) 105. Line 8, change 38(1) (II) (b) to 38(2) (b).
[THE END]
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